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Rohauer Revisited: "'Rear Window,"
Copyright Reversions, Renewals,
Terminations, Derivative Works
and Fair Use
BY RICHARD COLBY*
With the renewed filing in California of a copyright infringement
action involving the motion picture, "Rear Window," issues resolved
in a 1977 Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Rohauer v. Kil-
liam Shows, Inc.,' may come squarely before the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit in 1986. These issues, affecting distribution
rights in derivative works such as motion pictures, have fascinated
the copyright bar over the years, and may reach the United States
Supreme Court in the likely event of a conflict between the Second
and Ninth Circuits.
Copyright © 1986 Richard Colby
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tellectual Property Section of the State Bar of California; Trustee of The Copyright
Society of the U.S.A.; Member of the Advisory Board of Communications and the
Law. Former Chairman of the Copyright Committee of the Motion Picture Associa-
tion of America, Inc.
Mr. Colby's analyses and opinions are his own and do not necessarily represent the
views of the American Bar Association or of the State Bar of California or any of their
respective Sections or Committees, or of any other organization with which Mr. Colby
is associated.
Parallel citations in the forms most familiar to the intellectual property and copy-
right bars are provided for greater ease of access to cases and commentators cited. Ci-
tations to United States Patent Quarterly, a BNA publication, are shortened to
U.S.P.Q. Citations to the Patents, Trademarks and Copyright Journal, a BNA publica-
tion, are shortened to P.T.C.J.
1. 551 F.2d 484, 192 U.S.P.Q. 545, 41 COPYRIGHT OFF. BULL. 843 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 431 U.S. 949 (1977).
In 1981, the Second Circuit, albeit composed of a different bench
than that which decided Rohauer, seemingly went out of its way, in
Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings (Hopalong Cassidy),2 to refer
to Rohauer as an "aberration," 3 and in 1979 the Ninth Circuit in Rus-
sell v. Price (Pygmalion) 4 would "express no opinion about the mer-
its of Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc. which [the court noted] has
been the subject of adverse critical commentary."5
In 1985, four Justices of the Supreme Court said, in Mills Music,
Inc. v. Snyder, that a "narrower interpretation eventually prevailed,
but not until after passage of the 1976 Act. See Rohauer v. Killiam
Shows, Inc. "6 This statement by four Justices of the Supreme Court,
a sufficient number to grant certiorari, that Rohauer eventually pre-
vailed, should give the Ninth Circuit pause before ruling in the pres-
ent "Rear Window" litigation in reliance on Russell v. Price.
In view of this intriguing record, it may well be time to restudy
Rohauer, not only in the setting of its own history in the courts, and
in relation to the 1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts,7 but also in anticipa-
tion of decision in the new "Rear Window" litigation, Abend v. MCA
Inc. (Abend II).8
It is this writer's conclusion that the judgment in Rohauer was cor-
2. 668 F.2d 91, 218 U.S.P.Q. 750, COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 25,339 (2d Cir. 1981).
3. Id. at 93.
4. 612 F.2d 1123, 205 U.S.P.Q. 206, 43 COPYRIGHT OFF. BULL. 768, COPYRIGHT L.
DEC. (CCH) 25,125 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952 (1980).
5. Id. at 1126 n.10 (citing M. NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.07[A] at 3-25
to 3-32 (1979)) (citation omitted).
6. Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 105 S. Ct. 638, 655 n.7 (White J., dissenting) (cita-
tion omitted) (emphasis added). The 5-4 majority opinion by Justice Stevens does not
mention Rohauer. See infra note 27.
7. The 1909 Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (formerly codi-
fied at and hereinafter referred to as the 1909 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216). The
1976 Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-810 (1982)) (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216, the 1909 Act), amended by the Record
Rental Amendment of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727 (Oct. 4, 1984), 28 P.T.C.J.
587, 627, 667, COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 10,066-68. See N. BOORSTYN, COPYRIGHT
LAW § 5:18A, App. A:1 at 180-81 (1981 & Supp. 1985); M. NIMMER, 2 NIMMER ON COPY-
RIGHT §§ 8.04[H] at 8-77 to 8-78.1, 8.12[B]at 8-120, 8-130.1 to 8-130.5 (1985). Title 17 was
also amended November 8, 1984 by the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347, 28 P.T.C.J. 680-83, 29 P.T.C.J. 37-38, COPYRIGHT L.
REP. (CCH) 10,635-48 (1984) (the amendment added sections 901-914 as Chapter 9 to
Title 17). See N. BOORSTYN, I COPYRIGHT L. J. 74-79, 95, 112-14, 141-42 (1984-85); N.
BooRsTYN, II COPYRIGHT L.J. 11-12 (1985-86); N. BOORSTYN, COPYRIGHT LAW § 2:30,
App. A:1 at 182-90, App. A:2 at 229-49 (Supp. 1985); M. NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPY-
RIGHT § 18 (1985); M. NIMMER, 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, Apps. 30, 31 (1985). See also
THE SEMICONDUCTOR CHIP PROTECTION ACT OF 1984 (Law & Business, Inc./Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich 1984) (compilation of Legislative Materials, with Speaker Outlines).
8. Abend II is the 1984 action entitled Sheldon Abend, doing business as Authors
Research Company v. MCA Inc., Universal Film Exchanges, Inc., James Stewart, Pa-
tricia Hitchcock O'Connell and Samuel Taylor, as Co-Trustees of the Second (Residu-
ary) Trust under the Last Will of Alfred J. Hitchcock, deceased, No. 84-2483 AAH
(C.D. Cal. filed April 10, 1984).
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rect and fully consistent with copyright theory and, rather than hav-
ing been an aberration, was a reconfirmation of copyright in
derivative works, reflecting a proper and fair use9 of the underlying
literary work on which the derivative work is based, both under sec-
tion 7 of the 1909 Act and the more specific provisions of section
304(c)(6)(A) of the 1976 Act as analyzed by Judge Friendly in
Rohauer, in determining the intent of Congress when it passed the
1909 Act.10
These issues can seriously affect rights in all derivative works-
sound recordings of old standards, stage plays based on novels, mo-
tion pictures based on books and plays. Familiar motion pictures
whose copyright histories present fact patterns similar to those at is-
sue in Rohauer and Abend I include "George Washington Slept
Here," "Gone With The Wind," "The Man Who Came To Dinner,"
"The Night Has A Thousand Eyes," "A Place In The Sun," "Thanks
For The Memory," "You Can't Take It With You."
THE ROHAUER CASE
Rohauer held that the copyright owner of a motion picture deriva-
tive work made prior to 1978 could, under the 1909 Act, continue to
distribute that motion picture during the renewal term of the under-
lying work on which the motion picture was based, notwithstanding
the death of the author of the underlying literary work during the
original term of copyright of the underlying literary work.ll
In Rohauer, a silent motion picture entitled "The Son of the
Sheik," based on a novel entitled The Sons of the Sheik by Edith M.
Hull and starring Rudolph Valentino, was produced and released for
exhibition in the United States in 1926. Copyright in the motion pic-
ture was timely renewed and ultimately assigned to defendant Kil-
liam Shows, Inc. Mrs. Hull died in 1943, during the original 28 year
copyright term of her novel. Copyright in the novel was timely re-
newed in 1952 by Mrs. Hull's daughter, Cecil W. Hull, co-plaintiff in
the action by Raymond Rohauer against Killiam Shows, Inc. and
9. See discussion of Fair Use infra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
10. 551 F.2d at 486, 493, 494.
A derivative work prepared under authority of the grant before its termina-
tion may continue to be utilized under the terms of the grant after its termi-
nation, but this privilege does not extend to the preparation after the
termination of other derivative works based upon the copyrighted work cov-
ered by the terminated grant.
The 1976 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(A).
11. 551 F.2d at 485-86, 494.
others. Rohauer claimed as assignee for $1,250 of the motion picture
rights owned by Cecil W. Hull, then owner of the renewal copyright
in her mother's novel.
The original 1925 grant of motion picture rights by Mrs. Hull to
defendant's predecessor obligated the seller "to renew or procure the
renewal of the copyrights" in the novel and thereupon to assign to
the purchaser the motion picture rights, including the right to "vend,
exhibit, exploit and otherwise" distribute the motion picture.12 The
Rohauer court noted that this clause demonstrated the "intention of
the parties . . . that the Purchaser should be entitled to the motion
picture rights both for the original and for any renewal term."13
In 1971 "The Son of the Sheik" was shown on television station
WNET, which was owned by defendant Educational Broadcasting
Corporation operating Channel 13 in the New York City metropoli-
tan area. The videotape required for the exhibition was made from a
print of the motion picture. Neither the making of the videotape nor
the broadcast of the motion picture had been licensed by Rohauer or
by Hull. Station WNET had received a license from Killiam.
Suit ensued. The district court, in a decision reversed in 1977 by
the Second Circuit, held in the circumstances of the case that all
rights of defendants to authorize the exhibition of the motion picture
ended on May 14, 1953, the last day ofthe original copyright term of
the novel, because Mrs. Hull had died in 1943, during that original
copyright term, prior to the start of the copyright renewal term, of
the novel.14
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the Killiam defendants acknowl-
edged that no new motion picture versions of the novel could law-
fully have been made during the copyright renewal term of the novel
without plaintiffs' consent. However, they argued that they were en-
titled to renew the copyright in the motion picture (in 1954) and
could continue to authorize its exhibition during the then 28 year re-
newal term of the novel (1953-81).15
The Second Circuit agreed with the defendants and reversed the
district court. Judge Friendly noted that the appeal raised "a ques-
tion of copyright law of first impression."'16 As a key step to decision
in Rohauer, Judge Friendly referred to his quandary: "A court must
grope to ascertain what would have been the thought of the 1909
Congress on an issue about which it almost certainly never thought
12. I. at 486.
13. Id. at 486 n.2.
14. 379 F. Supp. 723, 183 U.S.P.Q. 592, 39 COPYRIGHT OFF. BULL. 665 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
15. 551 F.2d at 487.
16. Id. at 485.
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at all."'1 7 The right to continue to distribute the motion picture, the
court reasoned, was "more in keeping with the letter and purposes of
the statute as best we can discern them."18 This issue, involving valu-
able distribution rights in derivative works such as motion pictures,
may have another day in court in the "Rear Window" litigation,
Abend II, now before a federal district court in California.
THE "REAR WINDOW" LITIGATION (ABEND II)
Before discussing the opinion in Rohauer, the parallel fact situation
in the present "Rear Window" litigation, Abend II, should be noted.
Filed in April of 1984, the Abend Complaint and Answers indicate
that the motion picture "Rear Window," starring James Stewart and
Grace Kelly, was based on a story by Cornell Woolrich published in
December of 1941 or in early January of 1942 in Dime Detective Mag-
azine. The motion picture was produced and first released for exhibi-
tion in 1954. Its copyright was renewed in 1982.
Cornell Woolrich died in 1968. A copyright renewal certificate for
the Woolrich story was issued by the Register of Copyrights to Chase
Manhattan Bank as executor of the Woolrich estate on December 29,
1969. This date becomes critical, and may be fatal to Abend's claim,
as the actual publication date of the January 1942 issue of Dime
Detective Magazine may have been several days or weeks more than
28 years prior to December 28, 1969. If so, the failure of Chase Man-
hattan Bank to have timely registered the claim for copyright re-
newal in the Woolrich story "within one year prior to the expiration
of the original term of the copyright" may have thrown the story into
the public domain.19
Abend is the assignee of Chase Manhattan Bank. Defendant MCA
Inc. is the ultimate assignee of B. G. DeSylva Productions, Inc., to
whom Cornell Woolrich in 1945 had assigned the right to make and
distribute a motion picture based on the Woolrich story. Woolrich
had agreed to renew or procure the renewal of the copyright in the
story, and to assign to DeSylva and its successors and assigns, for the
copyright renewal term in the story, the same rights conveyed by the
1945 motion picture contract.
In 1983, MCA, through defendant Universal Film Exchanges, Inc.,
17. Id. at 486.
18. Id.
19. The 1909 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 24.
rereleased "Rear Window" theatrically in the United States. This ac-
tion followed.
Interestingly enough, a similar action had been filed by plaintiff
Abend in 1974 in federal court in New York, arising out of the broad-
cast of "Rear Window" on the ABC television network.20 That suit
was settled in 1976. In defendants' third affirmative defense in the
current case, the assertion is made that plaintiff is barred by the doc-
trine of estoppel from obtaining any relief sought in the present Cali-
fornia action.21
In Abend I, the present California litigation, defendants have
raised other interesting affirmative defenses, including the First
Amendment;22 the "original and independent property" rule enunci-
20. Abend v. American Broadcasting Company [Abend I] No. 74 Civ. 2336
(S.D.N.Y. filed May 30, 1974). See Amicus Curiae Brief of United Artists Corporation
at 25, Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 949
(1977).
21. Defendants' Answers, Third Affirmative Defense, Abend v. MCA Inc., No. 84-
2483 AAH (C.D. Cal. filed June 21, 1984).
22. See generally Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guaran-
tees of Free Speech and Press? 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970); M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON
FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 2.05[C] (1984); M. NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.10
(1985).
For a recent decision holding that a copyright term extension statute is unconstitu-
tional as violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, see United
Christian Scientists v. Christian Science Board of Directors, The First Church of
Christ, Scientist, 616 F. Supp. 476, 480-81, 227 U.S.P.Q. 40, 44, COPYRIGHT L. DEC.
(CCH) 25,830 at 19,773 (D.D.C. 1985). The statute entailed excessive "judicial engage-
ment ... to determine ... whether Mary Baker Eddy purported to write ex cathedra
as the divinely inspired prophet of a new faith, or in some less exalted capacity, merely
to decide whether they are within or without the copyright ..... 1d. at 481. In the
decision, the district court held unconstitutional Private Law 92-60 (92d Cong.) of De-
cember 15, 1971, which had extended the Mary Baker Eddy 1906 copyright on her book
Science and Health With Key to the Scriptures for 75 years from December 15, 1971
until December 14, 2046. An appeal to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is
pending. See Colby, Helen Sousa Abert, Mary Baker Eddy and Otto Harbach-The
Road to a Copyright Term of Life Plus Fifty Years, 6 Communications and the Law,
No. 3, June 1984, at 3, 12-17, cited in A. LATMAN, R. GORMAN & J. GINSBURG, COPY-
RIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES 205 (2d ed. 1985). See also 1984 Register of Copyrights Annual
Report at 9.
In another fascinating case, contrasting sharply with United Christian Scientists, a
district court in California signed a preliminary injunction restraining defendants, who
had "stolen" (according to the court) certain Church of Scientology religious materials
in Denmark, from "using, distributing, exhibiting or in any manner publicly revealing
any and all originals, copies . . . variations or altered versions of [certain specified]
confidential religious scriptures ... or the contents thereof." See Religious Technol-
ogy Center v. Wollersheim, 228 U.S.P.Q. 534, 536 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 1985) (appeal
pending in the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit).
The court's order was issued on the basis that plaintiffs would otherwise suffer ir-
reparable harm from the loss of trade secrets in connection with its confidential reli-
gious documents. The court stated that it was "not required to finally decide whether
the documents are sacred scriptures... or trade secrets." Id. (emphasis added).
Finding that the documents are more akin to methodology than to doctrine, the
court reserved judgment on that aspect of the matter until trial. Although not articu-
lated by the court, under section 102(b) of the 1976 Act, copyright protection does not
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ated in the Rohauer case;23 the absence of a separate copyright notice
for a magazine contribution;24 and, a defense of particular and consid-
erable moment, fair use.25
TERMINATION UNDER THE 1976 ACT
It may also be helpful to the discussion to indicate at this point the
connection between distribution rights in a motion picture derivative
work during the first 28 years of the copyright renewal term in an
underlying work such as the Hull novel or the Woolrich story, and
motion picture distribution rights during the additional 19 years by
which the 28 year copyright renewal term has been extended by the
1976 Act.2 6
If the author of the underlying work or, if the author has died, the
author's statutory successor timely terminates the author's grant,
extend to a "method of operation." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). Moreover, the court did not ob-
serve the similarity of the "trade secrets" cause of action to one sounding in copyright,
nor did the court refer to the potential unconstitutionality of an order that might be in
violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
The court's findings conclude that this case is a "stolen documents case and [that]
the theft appears to have been as much for economic as for doctrinal reasons." Reli-
gious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 228 U.S.P.Q. 534, 537 (C.D. Cal. filed Nov. 23,
1985).
23. The characterization "original and independent property" is that of defend-
ants' Second Affirmative Defense which reads in full as follows:
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
19. The REAR WINDOW motion picture released in 1954 is a derivative
work made under the authority of the author and purported copyright owner
of the underlying literary work, which owner imposed no limitation regarding
the time during which the motion picture might be exploited. Under the pro-
visions of the Copyright Act of 1909 and the judicial interpretation thereof, in-
cluding Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. &nied,
431 U.S. 949 (1977), the 1954 REAR WINDOW motion picture is an original
and independent property. In light of the equities of the parties and the cir-
cumstances in the case, the purported owner of the renewal term copyright in
the Woolrich story variously known as "It Had To Be Murder" or "Rear Win-
dow" may not obtain any relief or remedy with respect to the further distribu-
tion or other commercial exploitation of the 1954 REAR WINDOW motion
picture.
Abend v. MCA Inc. No. 84-2483 AAH (C.D. Cal. June 21, 1984).
24. Contra Goodis v. United Artists Television, Inc., 425. F.2d 397, 165 U.S.P.Q. 3,
37 COPYRIGHT OFF. BULL. 262 (2d Cir. 1970). See section 404(a) of the 1976 Act for the
law since 1978.
25. See discussion of Fair Use infra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
26. The 1976 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 304(b). N. BOORSTYN, COPYRIGHT LAW
§ 6:9 (1981 & Supp. 1985). A. LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 89-90 (5th ed. 1979). A.
LATMAN, R. GORMAN & J. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES 202-03 (2d ed.
1985).
then under section 304(c)(6)(A) of the 1976 Act the motion picture
derivative work, lawfully made during the original or renewal term
of the underlying work on which the motion picture was based, "may
continue to be utilized" (e.g., distributed). Neither the termination of
the right to make new derivative works (e.g., remakes or sequels),
nor the death of the author during the renewal or the original term
of copyright in the underlying work limit the right to continue to dis-
tribute the motion picture.27
27. Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 105 S. Ct. 638, 224 U.S.P.Q. 313, COPYRIGHT L. DEC.
(CCH) 25,739, 29 P.T.C.J. 240, 273 (1985), reh'g denied, 105 S. Ct. 1782 (1985), noted in
N. BooRSTYN, I COPYRIGHT L.J. 98-99 (1984-85). Mills Music was a 5-4 decision an-
nounced by Justice Stevens on January 8, 1985. The case was argued before the
Supreme Court on October 9, 1984, by retired Judge Marvin E. Frankel for the suc-
cessful Petitioner, and by retired Judge Harold R. Tyler, Jr. for the Respondents. 28
P.T.C.J. 669-71 (1984); Nat'l L.J., Oct. 22, 1984, at 13. The Mills Music decision re-
versed the Second Circuit's decision in Harry Fox Agency, Inc. v. Mills Music, Inc., 720
F.2d 733, 222 U.S.P.Q. 279, 27 P.T.C.J. 5, COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 25,589 (2d Cir.
1983) (which in turn reversed Judge Edward Weinfeld's "characteristically thorough
opinion," 543 F. Supp. 844, 214 U.S.P.Q. 871, 24 P.T.C.J. 325, COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH)
25,424 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)).
The circuit court and district court opinions are discussed in Note, A Judicial Cir-
cumscription of Rights Under The "Derivative Works Exception, "Section 304(c)(6)(A)
of the Copyright Act of 1976: Who's Sorry Now?, 6 WHITTIER L. REV. 923 (1984), and in
N. BOORSTYN, I COPYRIGHT L.J. at 98-99 (1984-85).
See Abrams, Who's Sorry Now? Termination Rights and the Derivative Works Ex-
ception, 62 U. DET. L. REV. 181 (1985), and 1985 ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE
ARTS HANDBOOK 95-153 (Clark Boardman 1985), for in depth analysis of the Supreme
Court and the three lower court opinions in Mills Music v. Snyder, with emphasis on
statutory interpretation and legislative history. For a discussion of Professor Colby's
testimony at the 1963 Meetings of the Panel of Copyright Consultants at the Library of
Congress, see Abrams, 1985 ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK
115 n.147, 117 n.149. See also infra notes 28 and 38. Professor Abrams' article is highly
instructive and demonstrates the usefulness of The Kaminstein Legislative History
Project [Kaminstein Project], infra note 54, for research into the legislative history of
the 1976 Act. See Abrams, supra at 142 n.88.
On August 1, 1985, a bill was introduced to amend the 1976 Act to reverse the rule in
Mills Music. H.R. 3163, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. E3783-84, (daily ed. Aug.
1, 1985), COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 20,322 (1985). In introducing the Bill, the pro-
posed Copyright Holder Protection Act of 1985, Congressman Howard L. Berman of
California quoted the April 1985 testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights
at the time of enactment of the 1976 Act, before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on
Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks: "'The Mills case is not what Congress intended,
and . . . it represents a windfall for publishers at the expense of authors and their
families .... The Supreme Court decision seriously undercuts what Congress in-
tended and deprives authors of benefits that are rightfully theirs.' " 131 CONG. REC.
E3784 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1985).
A similar bill is pending in the Senate, introduced by Senator Arlen Specter of
Pennsylvania on June 27, 1985. S. 1384, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S8971-72
(daily ed. June 27, 1985), COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 20,318 (1985). A hearing was
held on S. 1384 on November 20, 1985, before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on
Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks, Senator Specter presiding. See COPYRIGHT L.
REP. (CCH) 20,341. For a written statement on S. 1384, filed by the author with this
Subcommittee, see the Hearing Record.
In a written statement on S. 1384, filed by Ralph Oman, new Register of Copyrights,
with the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on November 20, 1985, the question whether
the bill would constitutionally operate retroactively was considered. The Register de-
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As stated by the Supreme Court in Mills Music Inc. v. Snyder:
"More particularly, the termination right was expressly intended to
relieve authors of the consequences of ill-advised and unremunera-
tive grants that had been made before the author had a fair opportu-
nity to appreciate the true value of his work product." 28
Section 304(c)(6)(A) of the 1976 Act will not become applicable to
"Rear Window" until the year 1998, 56 years after the Woolrich story
was copyrighted, provided that Woolrich's statutory successors, if
any, timely exercise their termination rights under section 304(c) to
be effective within 5 years after the start of the additional 19 years by
which the 28 year copyright renewal term in the Woolrich story has
been extended, under section 304(b) of the 1976 Act, from the end of
1998 to the end of the year 2017.
Thus, it may be said that Rohauer (at least in the Second Circuit,
scribed the issue to be whether the proposed statute would interfere with "vested
rights" or whether "a retroactive statute, by remedying an unexpected judicial deci-
sion, may actually effectuate the intentions of the parties." The Register quoted Hoch-
man, The Supreme Court and the. Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73
HARV. L. REV. 692, 693 (1960). See Statement of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights,
before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (Nov. 20, 1985).
28. 105 S. Ct. at 650. The Court further cited H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 124, 127 (1976) as "certainly persuasive legislative history." 105 S. Ct. at 650 nn.
39, 40. For a discussion of H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, see infra notes 38 and 54.
Several articles provide a comprehensive analysis of problems arising out of legisla-
tive approaches to so-called ill-advised and unremunerative grants under the 1909 Act
leading to the 1976 Act. See Ringer, Copyright Office Study No. 31 on Renewal of
Copyright (1960), reprinted in 1 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 503 (Arthur Fisher Memorial
ed. 1963):
There is more evidence of a Congressional recognition that author-publisher
contracts must frequently be made at a time when the value of the work is
unknown or conjectural and the author (regardless of his business ability) is
necessarily in a poor bargaining position.
Id. at 125 n.128. See also Kaminstein, Copyright Law Revision, 1961 Reg. of Copyrights
Rep. (Blue Book) 53-55, 92-94; M. NIMMER, 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 9.02 at 9-22 to 9-
24 (1985). For contrasting views, see MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC.,
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, pt. 2 at 341, 361-62, pt. 5 at 300-01, 300 n.1 (1963) (note 1 lists
several other sources including Colby, Some Essentials in Copyright Revision for Mo-
tion Pictures, infra note 38); 1965 Hearings on H.R. 4347 before Subcomm. No. 3 of
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 987, 996-97, 1048; B. KAPLAN, AN
UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 112-14 (1967):
The distinction (or effect on a grant or license of the renewal term if the au-
thor dies during the original copyright term) is hard to defend and may oper-
ate in a peculiarly perverse way where on the faith of a transfer from the
now-deceased author, the transferee has created a "derivative work," say a
movie based on the original novel.
B. KAPLAN, supra, at 112.
notwithstanding Filmvideo v. Hastings)29 is the rule for years 29-56
of the copyright renewal of the underlying work, and that section
304(c)(6)(A) of the 1976 Act is the rule for years 57-75, after which
the underlying work passes into the public domain in the United
States. We should also observe that, if Rohauer is not followed in the
Ninth Circuit in Abend II, there might be the following anomalous
result: the motion picture could not be distributed during years 29-
56, but could be rereleased during years 57-75, notwithstanding termi-
nation under section 304(c)(6)(A). If the author had not died during
years 1-28, the motion picture could be distributed throughout years
1-75.
The death of the author is not a precondition to the exercise of the
right of termination under the 1976 Act.3 0 If, however, the author
dies during years 29-56, and if the motion picture is produced during
years 29-56 (either before or after the author's death) rather than
during years 1-28, the motion picture may be lawfully distributed
during years 29-56, the copyright renewal term of the underlying
work, and during years 57-75, notwithstanding termination under sec-
tion 304(c)(6)(A).
29. 668 F.2d 91, 218 U.S.P.Q. 750, COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 25,339 (2d Cir. 1981).
See infra notes 98-99 and 101-04 and accompanying text.
30. See the 1976 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304(c). The persons who have the
power to terminate rights under the 1976 Act are limited by section 203(a)(1) and (2),
and by section 304(c)(1) and (2). See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 125-
26, 140-41 (1976), discussed infra at note 54. In the "Rear Window" situation, the au-
thor's grant may not be terminable by anyone, for the reason that the author, Cornell
Woolrich, evidently left no widow or children or grandchildren, the story copyright
having been renewed in 1969 by an executor. See supra text accompanying note 19.
An executor may renew a copyright only if the author leaves no widow or children.
For law review articles dealing with termination, see A. LATMAN, R. GORMAN & J.
GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES 611 (2d ed. 1985) (Bibliography to Chapter 4).
Writers of "works made for hire," 17 U.S.C. § 101, of which "the employer or other
person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author," 17 U.S.C. § 201(b),
do not have the right under the Copyright Act to terminate their grants under either
section 203 or section 304(c), which by their terms apply to copyrights other than a
copyright in a work made for hire.
The right of termination would not apply to "works made for hire," which is
one of the principal reasons the definition of that term assumed importance in
the development of the bill.
Section 203 (and section 304(c)) reflect a practical compromise that will fur-
ther the objectives of the copyright law while recognizing the problems and
legitimate needs of all interests involved.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 124-25 (1976). See also Colby, Copyright Re-
vision Revisited: Commissioned Works as Works Made For Hire Under The United
States Copyright Act, 5 WHITTIER L. REV. 491 (1983), 17 INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 379-402
(1985); Colby, Helen Sousa Abert, Mary Baker Eddy, and Otto Harbach-The Road to a
Copyright Term of Life Plus Fifty Years, 6 COMMUNICATIONS AND THE LAW, No. 3,
June 1984, at 3, 10 NEW MATTER (Journal of the Intellectual Property Section of the
State Bar of California), No. 1, Spring 1985, at 2; Jackson, Duration of Copyright
Under S.22, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 241 (1976); Sobel, A Practical Guide to Copyright
Ownership and Transfer, 5 ENTERTAINMENT L. REP., No. 9, Feb. 1984, at 3, Symposium
Materials on Copyright 41 (Los Angeles County Bar Association 1984).
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THE ROHAUER OPINION
Before proceeding to a brief discussion of the interesting fair use
defense in Abend 11,31 now pending in federal district court in Cali-
fornia, some analysis of Judge Friendly's opinion may be in order,
having in mind previous extensive and thorough discussions in the
literature, not to be repeated here.32
31. See discussion of Fair Use infra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
32. See articles collected in R. COLBY, 1981-1984 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION RE-
PORTS OF COMMITTEE ON AUTHORS OF THE SECTION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPY-
RIGHT LAW, and Jaszi, When Works Collide: Derivative Motion Pictures, Underlying
Rights, and the Public Interest, 28 UCLA L. REV. 715 (1981). See also M. NIMMER, 1
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.07[A] (1985); Krasilovsky and Meloni, Copyright Law as a
Protection Against Improvidence: Renewals, Reversions and Terminations, 5 COMMU-
NICATIONS AND THE LAW No. 4, Fall 1983, at 3; Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Deriv-
ative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 209 (1983); Karp, From Roth to
Rohauer: Twenty Years of Amicus Briefs, 25 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 1, 16 (1977-78).
Reversion or termination under United States law does not of itself terminate rights
under foreign law. For interesting aspects of foreign law in relation to copyright re-
version in certain circumstances and for the effect on United States rights of rever-
sions under United Kingdom law and the laws of other Commonwealth countries, see
Chappell & Co., Ltd. v. Redwood Music Ltd., [1980] 2 All E.R. 817 (decision in House of
Lords known as "Redwood Case"); Krasilovsky and Meloni, supra at 3; see also CoP-
INGER AND SKONE JAMES ON COPYRIGHT 419-20 (Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 12th ed.
1980); M. NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§ 11.02[B][2], 17.12 (1985).
On the question whether United Kingdom or United States law applies, see Red-
wood Music Ltd. v. Francis Day and Hunter Ltd., [1978] R.P.C. 429 (Goff, J.) (citing
Campbell Connelly & Co. v. Noble [1963] 1 All E.R. 237, discussed in Colby, Interna-
tional Copyright Protection, 10 N.Y.L.F. 45, 53-54 (1964), 44 REVUE INTERNATIONALE
Du DROIT D'AUTEUR 98, 129-31 (1964)). Campbell Connelly is quoted at length in 10
BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 121-24 (1962). See also Colby, Works Made for Hire in Inter-
national Copyright Law, 16 UNESCO COPYRIGHT BULL., No. 3, 1982, at 71, 78-79, 3 LoY.
L.A. ENTERTAINMENT L.J. 87, 96-98 (1983), 9 NEW MATTER (Journal of the Intellectual
Property Section of the State Bar of California), No. 2, Summer 1984, at 1; Gerson and
Levinson, Works Created in the Course of Employment and Works Made For Hire: A
Comparison Between Canadian and U.S. Copyright Laws, 3 LA REVUE CANADIENNE
DU DROIT D'AUTEUR, No. 3, September 1983, at 16, Rosen and Silber, Reversion Under
British Copyright Law, 1 JOURNAL OF COPYRIGHT, ENTERTAINMENT AND SPORTS LAW
OF THE TENNESSEE BAR ASSOCIATION, No. 1, Summer 1982, at 67.
On the jurisdiction of the federal courts to decide foreign copyright law issues, see
Overseas Programming Companies Ltd. v. Cinematographische Commerz-Anhalt and
Iduna, 684 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1982) (involving rights in the United Kingdom and France
in certain Laurel and Hardy films); Ahbez v. Edwin H. Morris & Co., Inc., 548 F. Supp.
664, COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 25,455 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (relating to copyright infringe-
ments alleged to have occurred outside the United States with respect to plaintiff's
musical composition "Nature Boy"); London Film Prod. Ltd. v. Intercontinental Com-
munications, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 47, 223 U.S.P.Q. 381, COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 25,634
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (a suit by a British corporation for copyright infringements by a New
York corporation alleged to have occurred under foreign copyright laws, not under the
United States Copyright Act, in Chile and other South American countries, with re-
spect to certain motion pictures including "The Private Life of Henry VIII"), discussed
in N. BOORSTYN, I COPYRIGHT L.J. 59-60 (1984-85); Maison Lazard et Compagnie v.
Underlying Rohauer is the court's view that section 7 of the 1909
Act establishes an independent and separate copyright for derivative
works as "[c]ompilations or abridgements, adaptations, arrangements,
dramatizations, translations, or other versions . . . of copyrighted
works [which] when produced with the consent of the proprietor of
the copyright in such works. . . shall be regarded as new works sub-
ject to copyright . . ... 33 This new work, to quote Judge Friendly,
"might involve a degree of intellectual effort and expense quite as
great as or considerably greater than the contribution of the author
of the underlying work. . .. "34
As the writer of this article has noted elsewhere, 35 the copyright in
Manfra, Tordella & Brooks, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 1286 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (recognizing a cause
of action in a French citizen under the Lanhani Act and the applicable Paris Conven-
tion regarding unfair competition for the sale outside the United States of Olympic
Commemorative Coins, in violation of a contract between defendant and the United
States Department of the Treasury (not a party to the action) restricting sale to the
United States, plaintiff having previously acquired from the United States Treasury
Department the exclusive right to market the coins outside the United States. "It
seems to us there could be no clearer indication of a contract for the benefit of a third
party. ... Id. at 1288).
See generally M. NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§ 17.02, 17.03(1985); N. BooR-
STYN, COPYRIGHT LAW § 11:6 (1985); A. LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 260-73 (5th ed.
1979); A. LATMAN, R. GORMAN AND J. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES 297-99,
305-06 (2d ed. 1985); S. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING
RIGHTS (Butterworth & Co. London 1983); Colby, International Copyright Protection,
10 N.Y.L.F. 45 (1964), 44 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D'AUTEUR 99 (1964);
Kirios, Territoriality and International Copyright Infringement Actions, 22 CoPY-
RIGHT L. SYMP. [ASCAP] 53 (1977).
33. The 1909 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 7 (emphasis added). Section 7 provides in
full:
COPYRIGHT ON COMPILATIONS OF WORKS IN PUBLIC DOMAIN OR
OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS; SUBSISTING COPYRIGHTS NOT
AFFECTED.
- Compilations or abridgments, adaptations, arrangements, dramatizations,
translations, or other versions of works in the public domain or of copyrighted
works when produced with the consent of the proprietor of the copyright in
such works, or works republished with new matter, shall be regarded as new
works subject to copyright under the provisions of this title; but the publica-
tion of any such new works shall not affect the force or validity of any sub-
sisting copyright upon the matter employed or any part thereof, or be
construed to imply an exclusive right to such use of the original works, or to
secure or extend copyright in such original works.
34. 551 F.2d at 487.
35. See infra text accompanying note 74. On the administrative practices of the
Copyright Office with regard to motion pictures under the 1909 Act and derivative
works under the 1976 Act, see Compendium of Copyright Office Practices under the
1909 Act:
a. Authorship.
1. The law requires a statement of the author's citizenship and the ap-
plication form calls for his name.
2. The law does not make the identity of the "author" of a motion pic-
ture clear.
(1) Ordinarily a motion picture embodies a large number of
contributions, including those of the author of the story,
author of the screenplay, director, editor, cameraman, indi-
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the new (derivative) work should include all aspects of copyright,
such as exclusive distribution and vending of the motion picture dur-
ing the term of all copyrights in that motion picture. This view does
not deny the "force or validity" clause in section 7, as discussed in de-
tail by Judge Friendly in the light of its legislative history.36 This
view would seem to be fully consistent with the balance of section 7
vidual producer, etc. These persons ordinarily are not re-
garded as the "author" of the film in the copyright sense.
(2) Since most films are largely "made for hire" the employer
is usually regarded as the "author." In most cases the em-
ployer is the producing company, although there may be
cases where a releasing company, a bank or other organi-
zation or an individual is regarded as the author.
Compendium of Copyright Office Practices under the 1909 Act [Compendium I] Ch.
2.14.3.111 at 2-579 (1973). See also Compendium of Copyright Office Practices under the
1976 Act [Compendium II] Chs. 204.02, 306, 405.02, 408, 436, 450.08, 476, 480.04 and 496,
ML 313, 49 Fed. Reg. 23125-26 (1984); Announcement of the availability for inspection
and copying of Compendium II, effective February 14, 1985, ML 323 (January 1985),
reprinted in 50 Fed. Reg. 6288 (1985).
On the right to "vend" a copyrighted work, see Colby, The First Sale Doctrine-The
Defense That Never Was?, 32 J. COPYRIGHT SoC'Y 77 (1984-85), 21 COPYRIGHT 192-205
(Official Copyright Journal in English of the World Intellectual Property Organiza-
tion) (Geneva 1985), 98 LE DROIT D'AUTEUR 169-84 (Official Copyright Journal in
French of the World Intellectual Property Organization) (Geneva 1985), 100 ARCHIV
FUR URHEBER-FILM-FUNK-UND THEATERRECHT [UFITA] 165-96 (Munich 1985), 1985
ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS HANDBOOK 172-205 (Clark Boardman
1985), The Law and Business of Music in the 80's: Developments and Trends, 3
U.C.L.A. Extension Syllabus 989-1018 (Fall 1985); in Production and Distribution of
Videocassettes, Ninth Annual Symposium Syllabus 362, Los Angeles County Bar Asso-
ciation (1986); in Government Regulation in the Music Industry, Fourth Annual En-
tertainment Law Symposium Syllabus 98, Pepperdine University School of Law (1986);
and in Japanese in Japan by its Copyright Research Institute. See also N. BOORSTYN, I
COPYRIGHT L.J. 137 (1984-85) and II COPYRIGHT L.J. 66 (1985-86) (The First Sale Doc-
trine is an article that "may make new law."). Cf. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v.
Aveco, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 315, COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 25,811, 227 U.S.P.Q. 397
(M.D. Pa. 1985); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Professional Real Estate Investors,
Inc., 228 U.S.P.Q. 743, 31 P.T.C.J. 223 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 1986).
For copyright registration of motion pictures, music in motion pictures, screenplays
and continuity scripts, based on the deposit of only one videotape or motion picture
theatrical print, as applicable, see Colby, Music In Motion Pictures, 30 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y 34 (1982-83), 2 ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW 3 (American Bar Association Fo-
rum Committee on the Entertainment and Sports Industries) (1983), 9 NEW MATTER
(Journal of the Intellectual Property Section of the State Bar of California), No. 1,
Winter 1984, at 3, 3 U.C.L.A. Extension Syllabus 968-70 (Fall 1985). Such simultaneous
registrations on two separate occasions "set a precedent." See, to this effect, Brylaw-
ski, E.T.: An Extraterrestrial Caught in a Copyright Dilemma, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
395, 404 n.36 (1984).
On the registrability of videotape under the 1909 Act, see Colby, An Historic
"First"--Cpyright Office Accepts Magnetic Video Tape for Registration, 8 BULL.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 205 (1960-61); See also 1961 Register of Copyrights Annual Report 5.
36. 551 F.2d at 488-90.
that "the publication of any such new works shall not ...be con-
strued to imply an exclusive right to such use of the original works
.... ,37 The copyright owner of the new work has a nonexclusive
right to use the underlying work in the new work to the extent in-
corporated and used in the new work, but only in a derivative work
made during the original term of copyright in the underlying work.
By the same token, the author's statutory successors have an exclu-
sive right to use or license the use of the underlying work during its
renewal term to create new motion pictures, e.g., remakes and se-
quels. The original grantee's right to produce derivative works seems
to revert to the author's statutory successor upon the first day of the
copyright renewal term of the underlying work, if the author dies
during its original copyright term. Such a result should not termi-
nate distribution rights in the new work made during the original
copyright term of the underlying work because the new work has its
own section 7 copyright.
The arguments that the author's statutory successors should have
the opportunity to negotiate new licenses to produce additional new
works need not be denied.38 It is the independent copyright of the
section 7 new work that is to be vindicated by its continued vitality,
notwithstanding the death of the author of the other copyrighted
work-the underlying literary work.
To the extent that plaintiffs argued in Rohauer, and may argue
again in Abend II, that the continued distribution of the motion pic-
ture, in competition with a potential new work to be licensed by
plaintiffs, would "affect the force" of the copyright in the underlying
work by preventing the author's statutory successors from granting
exclusive rights in the underlying work,39 the simple answer is that
section 7 itself recognizes such nonexclusivity by its statement that
37. The 1909 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 7.
38. See infra text accompanying note 72. See also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1976):
[T]he proposed law should substitute for ... the reversionary provisions of
the present section on copyright renewal ... a provision safeguarding au-
thors against unremunerative transfers. A provision of this sort is needed be-
cause of the unequal bargaining position of authors, resulting in part from the
impossibility of determining a work's value until it has been exploited. Sec-
tion 203 reflects a practical compromise that will further the objectives of the
copyright law while recognizing the problems and legitimate needs of all in-
terests involved.
See also Colby, Some Essentials in Copyright Revision for Motion Pictures, 1963 SEC-
TION PROCEEDINGS 72, 11 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 19 (1963-64) (an Address to the
American Bar Association Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law); CoPy-
RIGHT LAW REVISION (Brown Book) pt. 3 at 59, 78, 268, 278-81 (1964) (Transcripts of
Meetings of the Panel of Consultants to the Copyright Office on January 16, 1963 at
the Library of Congress), reprinted in 3 G. GROSSMAN, OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (1976).
39. 551 F.2d at 488.
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section 7 shall not be construed to imply in the copyright owner of
the new work an exclusive right to such use of the original underly-
ing work. Section 7 necessarily recognizes the right of the copyright
owner of the new work to the nonexclusive use of the underlying
work to the extent already incorporated in the derivative work.
In the second part of the court's opinion in Rohauer, Judge
Friendly examined the cases cited as precedent, as well as the avail-
able prior advice from the commentators, the court concluding as to
the nonjudicial materials that "[w]e thus do not discern any such im-
pressive record of unanimity among the commentators as influenced
the Supreme Court in the Fred Fisher case .... "40 Among the
cases, the most interesting for purposes of this study are Fitch v. Shu-
bert,41 a 1937 New York federal district court case quoted and dis-
cussed by Judge Friendly,42 and Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v.
Charles K Harris Music Publishing Co.,43 a 1958 Second Circuit case
in which the opinion was authored by Chief Judge Clark.
Fitch and Marks Music are central to an analysis of Rohauer, be-
ginning with a re-evaluation of the oft-quoted phrase in Fitch that if
the author dies during the original term of copyright, the author's
statutory successors acquire "a new and independent right in the
copyright, free and clear of any rights, interests, or licenses attached
to the copyright for the initial term."44 Not only was this quotation
dicta, the district court deciding, in denying a motion for preliminary
injunction, that defendants had actually acquired a license from
plaintiff "by direct dealings with him in the renewal term,. . ."45 but
Fitch also did not involve in any way a grant for the renewal term;
The original 1925 license was limited to the original copyright term.
Judge Patterson in the district court in Fitch, as quoted by Judge
Friendly in Rohauer, stated:
[I]t is clear that the plaintiff acquired a new and independent right in the
copyright, free and clear of any rights, interests, or licenses attached to the
copyright for the initial term . . . . It is evident therefore that all rights
which the defendants acquired in 1925 to use the Fitch play as the basis of a
musical operetta expired when the copyright for the original term expired in
1928 and when a new grantee appeared as owner of the Fitch play for the re-
40. Id. at 493 (citing Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643,
658-59 nn.5-8).
41. 20 F. Supp. 314, 35 U.S.P.Q. 245, 21 COPYRIGHT OFF. BULL. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
42. 551 F.2d at 490-91.
43. 255 F.2d 518, 117 U.S.P.Q. 308, 31 COPYRIGHT OFF. BULL. 504 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 358 U.S. 831 (1958).
44. 20 F. Supp. at 315.
45. 551 F.2d at 490.
newal term.
4 6
Judge Friendly then commented:
However, this was said in a case where without dispute the original license
agreement was limited to the first term; not only did the license agreement
make no reference to renewal rights, but no one could have meant it to do so.
The Shuberts had not obtained the license agreement from an author who
could contemplate renewal, but from a charitable grantee after the author's
death, when the renewal rights had passed by statute to the next of kin sur-
viving at the end of the original term.
4 7
In Marks Music, defendant Harris similarly had not acquired the
renewal rights. "The conveyance . .. makes no mention of renewal
rights . . "48 Plaintiff, however, had entered into an agreement
with the composer Joseph E. Howard "which clearly provided for the
assignment [to plaintiff] of the renewal copyrights in Howard's
songs. '"49 The case thus involved only the simple determination that
defendant had not acquired any renewal rights in Howard's songs,
and that plaintiff had. Nevertheless, Judge Clark went on to say, in a
frequently quoted passage, that the "cases are clear that a copyright
renewal creates a separate interest distinct from the original copy-
right and that a general transfer by an author of the original copy-
right without mention of renewal rights conveys no interest in the
renewal rights, without proof of a contrary intention."50
The notion of a "new and independent right in the copyright [re-
newal], free and clear of any rights, interests, or licenses attached to
the copyright for the initial term" (Judge Patterson in Fitch),51 and
the statement that the "cases are clear that a copyright renewal cre-
ates a separate interest distinct from the original copyright" (Judge
Clark in Marks Music) 52 ought to be reexamined by careful analysis
of the facts to determine whether renewal rights were even impli-
cated, and whether facts similar to those of Rohauer or the "Rear
Window" litigation were present. Judge Friendly found in Rohauer
that:
Turning to the precedents, we do not find that any of the Supreme Court deci-
sions discussed at length in the briefs . . . has any real bearing on the issue
here before us, either in holding or in opinion. All these cases were con-
cerned with the relative rights of persons claiming full assignment or owner-
ship of the renewal term of an underlying copyright. None involved the
question here presented of effecting a proper reconciliation between the grant
of derivative copyright in § 7 and the final proviso of § 24 with respect to re-
newals of underlying copyrights.
Appellees contend that even if this be so, the question here at issue has been
46. Id. at 490 (citations omitted) (quoting Fitch, 20 F. Supp. at 315).
47. Id. at 490-91 (citation omitted).
48. 255 F.2d at 520.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 521.
51. 20 F. Supp. at 315.
52. 255 F.2d at 521.
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settled in their favor by lower court decisions, notably Fitch v. Shubert...
[W]e do not find that any of them decided the question here at issue.
The short of the matter is that we have been cited to no case holding that the
inability of an author to carry out his promise to effect a renewal of a copy-
right because of his death prior to the date for obtaining renewal terminates
as a matter of copyright law the right of a holder of a derivative copyright to
continue to publish a derivative work copyrighted before the author's death
on which the copyright was thereafter renewed. It is equally true that we
have been cited no case upholding such a right.5 3
Analysis thus can turn to some of the commentators, and then to
how the court found that the intent of the 1976 Congress (or the 1966
House Judiciary Committee or the 1962 Congress) was helpful in ap-
plying the 1909 Act.5 4
53. 551 F.2d at 490-92 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
54. The 1976 Act was the "culmination of a major legislative reexamination of
copyright doctrine," Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 105 S. Ct. 2218,
2226, 225 U.S.P.Q. 1073, 1077, COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 25,793 at 19569-70 (1985), "a
revision effort lasting more than 20 years," Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 462 n.9, 104 S. Ct. 774, 799 n.9, 220 U.S.P.Q. 665, 672 n.9,
COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 25,615 at 18,735 n.9, 27 P.T.C.J. 259 (1984) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting), "[w]hen in 1976, after more than 20 years of study, Congress adopted a
comprehensive revision of the Copyright Act .... Dowling v. United States, 105 S.
Ct. 3127, 3136, 226 U.S.P.Q. 529, 536, COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 25,795 at 19,609, 30
P.T.C.J. 225 (1985). See also infra note 108.
For the legislative history of the 1976 Act, see S. REP. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975), reprinted in 13 G. GROSSMAN, OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY (1976); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in N.
BOORSTYN, COPYRIGHT LAW, App. A:4 (1981), M. NIMMER, 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
App. 4 (1985), 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659 and 17 G. GROSSMAN, OMNIBUS
COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (1976). See also Conference Report, H.R.
REP. No. 94-1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in N. BOORSTYN, COPYRIGHT
LAW App. A:5 (1981), M. NIMMER, 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, App. 5 (1985), 17 G.
GROSSMAN, OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (1976).
See also 35 Copyright Studies Prepared for the Copyright Office (1955-63) (Prints of
the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate), reprinted in 1 & 2 STUD-
IES ON COPYRIGHT (Arthur Fisher Memorial ed. 1963), also reprinted in 1, 2 & 2A G.
GROSSMAN, OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (1976).
See also 1961 Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the US.
Copyright Law (Blue Book), a print of House Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1961); Copyright Law Revision pt. 2, Discussion and Comments on Report of the
Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the US. Copyright Law, a print of
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); Copyright Law Revision
pt. 3, Preliminary Draft for Revised US. Copyright Law and Discussions and Com-
ments on the Draft, a print of House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1964); Copyright Law Revision pt. 4, Further Discussions and Comments on Prelimi-
nary Draft for Revised US. Copyright Law, a print of House Comm. on the Judiciary,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); Copyright Law Revision pt. 5, 1964 Revision Bill with Dis-
cussions and Comments, a print of House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1965); Copyright Law Revision pt. 6, Supplementary Report of the Register of
Copyrights on the General Revision of the US. Copyright Law (Yellow Book): 1965 Re-
vision Bill, a print of House Comm. on Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); Draft
ROHAUER COMMENTATORS
In analyzing the precedents, the commentators disagree even as to
Second Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision
of the U.S. Copyright Law: 1975 Revision Bill (Oct.-Dec. 1975) (unpublished). All
these are reprinted in 3 & 4 G. GROSSMAN, OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY (1976).
See also 1965 Hearings on H.R. 4347 and other bills for the General Revision of the
Copyright Law, pts. 1, 2 and 3, before Subcomm. No. 3 of House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1966).
Of major assistance through the 1965, 1966 and 1967 hearings before the Senate Judi-
ciary Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks is its index of hearings on
S. 1006 and S. 597. The best guide, in addition to The Kaminstein Legislative History
Project, infra, to the copyright revision hearings and reports is to be found in H.R.
REP. No. 94-1476, 94 Cong., 2d Sess. 47-50 (1976).
See also the 1975 testimony of Barbara Ringer, then Register of Copyrights, and 18
Briefing Papers, before the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representa-
tives in Hearings on H.R. 2223, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 91, 1779, 1807, 1865, 1901, 2051-91
(1975).
See also THE KAMINSTEIN LEGISLATIVE HISTORY PROJECT: A COMPENDIUM AND ANA-
LYTICAL INDEX OF MATERIALS LEADING TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976 (A. Latman &
J. Lightstone eds. 1981-85) (The six volumes are now available through The Copyright
Society of the U.S.A. and New York University School of Law.).
See Goldberg, Morton David, Promoting the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: A
Commentary on the Copyright Office Report on General Revision of the United States
Copyright Law, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 549 (1962); Goldberg, Morton David, Copyright Law
Revision, Part 2, 10 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 214 (1962-63); B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED
VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 79-128 (1967).
The 1966 Report of the House Judiciary Committee, H.R. REP. No. 2237, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess., was the first in a series of congressional reports on copyright revision, and
much of the 1966 Report appears in the 1976 Report. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). In turn, the 1966 Report, H.R. REP. No. 2237, can be traced to
the 1965 Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights and the 1963-64 meetings
of the Panel of Consultants to the Copyright Office, and indeed to the 1961 Report of
the Register of Copyrights. This part of the legislative history, with citations to all of
the legislative reports from 1966 to 1976, is summarized in the 1976 Report, H.R. REP.
No. 94-1476 supra at 47-50, and in S. REP. NO. 94-473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 47-50 (1975).
Many of these reversion, renewal and termination issues were discussed in 1962 in
H.R. REP. NO. 1742, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) and in S. REP. No. 1888, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1962), in connection with the 1962 Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No.
87-668, 76 Stat. 555 (1962) (H.R.J. Res. 627). For this early history of copyright revi-
sion, see Colby, Helen Sousa Abert, Mary Baker Eddy, and Otto Harbach - The Road
to a Copyright Term of Life Plus Fifty Years, 6 COMMUNICATIONS AND THE LAW, No. 3,
June 1984, at 3, 10 NEW MATTER (Journal of the Intellectual Property Section of the
State Bar of California) No. 1, Spring 1985, at 2.
For the legislative history of the 1909 Act as background to the 1976 Act, see House
Report on the Copyright Act of 1909, H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909),
reprinted in M. NIMMER, 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, App. 13 (1985), also reprinted in
H. HOWELL, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 253-77 (3d ed. 1952) and LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT (E. Brylawski and A. Goldman eds. 1976) (pre-1909 Copy-
right Act Hearings and Reports); Copyright in Congress 1789-1904, 8 COPYRIGHT OFF.
BULL. (1905), reprinted in 1976 by Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut; A. BIR-
RELL, SEVEN LECTURES ON THE LAW AND HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT IN BOOKS (1899); G.
PUTNAM, THE QUESTION OF COPYRIGHT (3d ed. 1904).
For the text of the 1909 Act, Pub. L. No. 349, 35 Stat. 1075, see N. BOORSTYN, COPY-
RIGHT LAW, App. A:6 (1981 & Supp. 1985); M. NIMMER, 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, App.
6 (1985); A. LATMAN, R. GORMAN & J. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES, App.
B (2d ed. 1985); Copyright Office Circular 91 [old series] (1973); Copyright Enactments
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the holdings of the cases. Each case presents fascinating issues, but
(Copyright Office Bulletin No. 3) 64-86 and 102-21 (rev. ed. 1973); A. LATMAN, THE
COPYRIGHT LAW, App. B (5th ed. 1979).
As to the larger question whether the intent of Congress is to be found in its de-
bates, its reports, and its hearings, there is a good deal of fascinating precedent in the
cases. In Harry Fox Agency, Inc. v. Mills Music, Inc., 720 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1983), revd
sub nom. Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 105 S. Ct. 638 (1985), the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit stated:
The Act was drafted and redrafted several times by the Copyright Office of
the Library of Congress, which is a part of the legislative branch itself, 2
U.S.C. §§ 131-170 (Cum. Supp. 1977). The draft went through a number of
stages commencing with the Register's Report of July 1961 and including nu-
merous revisions as set forth in Copyright Law Revision Parts 1-6, as to which
panel discussions with industry representatives were held and objections and
suggested amendments made. Ultimately the relevant provisions were
presented to and enacted unchanged by Congress. Thus the principal expres-
sion of the drafter's intent is found in the twenty years of history before the
bill came to Congress, although H.R. Rep. No. 1476 and S. Rep. No. 473 are
useful, of course, as is the Conference Report on the Copyright Act of 1976.
Id. at 736 (emphasis added). See also supra note 27.
In Jondora Music Publishing Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 506 F.2d 392, 184
U.S.P.Q. 326, 40 COPYRIGHT OFF. BULL. 700 (3d Cir. 1974), the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit said:
But a court is not bound by a congressional interpretation of a statute passed
in a preceding session. The weight to be given a legislative committee's views
on the meaning of a statute enacted in years past is the same as that given to
any other commentator-having due regard to whether the subject was specif-
ically addressed and to the objective of the committee work.
Id. at 396.
In Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Colorado Magnetics, Inc., 497 F.2d 285, 181
U.S.P.Q. 129, 182 U.S.P.Q. 131, 39 COPYRIGHT OFF. BULL. 489 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. de-
nied 419 U.S. 1120 (1975), the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed:
In the first place, we are of course not bound by Congress' interpretation of a
prior existing law. Golsen v. C..R., 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 940 (1971). Indeed, whatever merit there may be in the practice of
relying on the opinion of a later Congress as to the intent of an earlier one
wanes with the length of time which separates the two sessions, which in the
instant case was sixty-three years. For an indication of the interpretation
given the Act of 1909 by the judiciary shortly after its enactment, see Aeolian
Co. v. Royal Music Roll Co., 196 F. 926 (1912).
Id. at 289 (emphasis added).
In Eastern Microwave, Inc. v. Doubleday Sports, Inc., 691 F.2d 125, 216 U.S.P.Q. 265,
COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 25,457 (2d Cir. 1982), the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit similarly found that "[l]ater pronouncements of the Congress cannot be looked
to as indicative of its intent at the time of a statute's enactment." Id. at 129 n.11.
In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429, 203
U.S.P.Q. 656, 43 COPYRIGHT OFF. BULL. 883, COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 25,106 (C.D.
Cal. 1979), a federal district court cited a variety of sources for judicial interpretation
of congressional intent:
See Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 13 (1978) (statements by committee
chairmen and bill sponsors are entitled to great weight); Zuber v. Allen, 396
U.S. 168, 192 (1969) (departmental construction of its own enabling legislation
carries most weight when department administrators participated in drafting
and expressed their views to Congress in committee hearings); First National
may be distinguishable and of little value to this analysis. As dis-
cussed above, Judge Friendly found no case relevant either way. In
1960, the writer of this article observed that:
While there are decisions to the effect that the renewal term is a separate es-
tate, such decisions have no relevance to the instant situation. They apply
where, for example, an author has granted a license for motion picture rights
in a book for "the term of copyright therein" without squarely indicating that
the time in which to make a motion picture includes the renewal term. In
that area, the renewal term is indeed free of the license. The separate-estate
argument also applies where the author dies prior to the 28th year and the
inheriting widow refuses to extend the producer's time in which to make the
projected motion picture-an issue of considerable importance when dealing
with elderly authors, and of dramatic effect when a young author dies. 5
5
Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 259-60 (1966) (state-
ments of committee members may be considered) and Ideal Farms, Inc. v.
Benson, 288 F.2d 608, 616 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 965 (1963) (com-
ments during floor debate by a sponsoring senator may be considered).
Id. at 445 n.1.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the appeal from the district court's
decision in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 963, 211
U.S.P.Q. 761, COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 25,308 (9th Cir. 1981), stated:
It is well settled that silence cannot be viewed as an expression of Congres-
sional intent. Beyond that, where the meaning of a statute is clear and unam-
biguous, it would be highly improper to construe inconclusive legislative
history so as to apply a statute in a manner inconsistent with its claimed
meaning.
Resort to the legislative history of an Act is entirely unnecessary when the
statute is clear and unequivocal on its face. The legislative history of a statute
is not relevant when the terms of the statute are clear and unambiguous.
Id. at 968 (citations omitted). See also infra note 108.
At the federal district court level in Harry Fox Agency, Inc. v. Mills Music, Inc., 543
F. Supp. 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), see supra note 27, Judge Edward Weinfeld, District Judge
for the Southern District of New York, wrote:
This is an unusual case, however, because, as already noted, Congress first
turned to the Copyright Office to lay the groundwork for the general revision
of the copyright laws. The panel discussions, at which the statements relied
upon by the Snyders were made, were used by the Office to compromise dif-
ferences among the various interest groups and to help it to prepare its draft
revision bills, which formed the basis for the 1976 Act. Nevertheless, the
House Judiciary Committee, through its chairman, expressly disavowed the
statements made in the committee prints:
In issuing this material the committee neither approves nor disapproves any
of the views expressed therein. The material is issued for the information
and convenience of persons interested in U.S. copyright law revision.
Moreover, even if this Court were to treat the statements made at the panel
discussions as equivalent to statements made directly before the Committee at
its own hearings, such testimony would not be a reliable gauge of legislative
intent because the views expressed by witnesses are not necessarily the same
as those of the legislators ultimately voting on the bill. Accordingly, state-
ments made at committee hearings by representatives of various interests are
entitled to little if any weight in interpreting Congressional intent.
Id. at 864 (citations omitted). Cf. Encyclopedia Britannica Educational Corp. v. Crooks,
542 F. Supp. 1156, 214 U.S.P.Q. 697, COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 25,443 (W.D.N.Y.
1982). "[T]he Supreme Court has observed that '[t]he search for significance in the si-
lence of Congress is too often the pursuit of a mirage.'" 542 F. Supp. at 1183 (citing
Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 11 (1942)).
55. Colby, Duration of Copyright in the United States-Status of Assignments of
Copyright Renewals-The Billy Rose Case, 7 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 203, 204 (1960), 32
ARCHIV FUR URHEBER-FILM-FUNK-UND THEATERRECHT [UFITA] 1 (1960), cited in
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The late Professor Alan Latman made the following penetrating
analysis of the cases, pointing out, in his fourth paragraph, that the
derivative work enjoys "its own copyright under section 7 of the 1909
law."
It is generally recognized that a renewal copyright is "a new and independent
right in the copyright, free and clear of any rights, interests or licenses at-
tached to the copyright for the initial term."5 6 Through the application of
this rule in Fitch [v. Shubert], all rights which the defendants had there ac-
quired to use a play as the basis of an operetta expired by operation of the
statute when the original term ended and the author's next of kin granted the
renewal copyright to a new owner.
Can renewal, in cutting off a license granted during the initial term, thus pre-
vent exploitation of a derivative work, such as motion picture, play, or opera,
created pursuant to the license? In G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., the opera "Madame Butterfly" was created by plaintiff under the license
from the proprietors of copyright in a play and a novel. Plaintiff later claimed
the right to make a motion picture version of its opera. Although the copy-
right in the play was not renewed, the copyright in the novel was.
The court construed the license to cover only the original term of copyright
and, following the approach of Fitch v. Shubert, accordingly held that "the
plaintiff is not entitled to make general use of the novel for a motion picture
version." The effect of this decision was to prevent, during the renewal pe-
riod, exploitation of any picture insofar as it incorporated portions of the op-
era based on the noveL5 7 Without making any distinction between the opera
and motion picture versions, most commentators had read Ricordi as preclud-
ing exploitation in the renewal period of any derivative work incorporating
underlying material not licensed for use in the renewal period. 58
In any event, the thrust of Fitch and Ricordi was sharply limited by Rohauer
v. Killiam Shows, Inc., which permitted exploitation of a motion picture in the
renewal period even though the author/licensor had died prior to renewal and
her daughter (who had renewed) granted exclusive motion picture rights to
plaintiff. The intent of the author to grant renewal rights in Rohauer was
held to distinguish Fitch and Ricordi, even though the author's death would
seem to have frustrated that intent by cutting off her contingent renewal
rights. The decision results in an exception upon the "new estate" concept of
renewals to permit exploitation of a derivative work (enjoying its own copy-
right under § 7 of the 1909 law) but not the creation of new derivative works.
The court found support for its view in the parallel exception from the effect
Ringer, Renewal of Copyright, Study No. 31, supra note 28, at 164 nn.431, 432, and 169
n.479.
56. See Fitch v. Shubert, 20 F. Supp. 314, 315, 35 U.S.P.Q. 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
57. Cf. Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 426 F. Supp. 690, 193 U.S.P.Q. 305
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("Hopalong Cassidy" films and novels). See also infra notes 98-104 and
accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., Bricker, Renewal and Extension of Copyright, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 23,
43 (1955); Ringer, Renewal of Copyright, Studies on Copyright, supra note 28, at 565-66.
But see Engel, Importation and Protection of Works of American Authors Manufac-
tured Abroad Via the UCC Exemption From Formalities: How Now Sacred Cow?, 12
BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 83, 119 n.126 (1964-65). Professor Engel's note 126 is cited and
discussed by Judge Friendly in Rohauer. See infra text accompanying notes 70-71.
of termination of transfers found in the 1976 Act.5 9
The late Professor Melville B. Nimmer found that some cases have
"repudiated" the "new property right" theory, expressed in the Sec-
ond Circuit in somewhat different circumstances in Edmonds v. Stern
in 1918. Professor Nimmer has written that:
It has been suggested that once a derivative work is created pursuant to a
valid license to use the underlying material, a new property right springs into
existence with respect to the entire derivative work, so that even if the license
is thereafter terminated the proprietor of the derivative work may neverthe-
less continue to use the material from the underlying work as contained in
the derivative work. This conclusion is neither warranted by any express pro-
vision of the Copyright Act, nor by the rationale as to the scope of protection
achieved in a derivative work.
It is moreover contrary to the axiomatic copyright principle that a person may
exploit only such copyrighted literary material as he either owns or is licensed
to use. This "new property right" theory was in effect repudiated in G. Ri-
cordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.... It was repudiated once again in
Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. . . . After Gilliam it
would have seemed that the "new property right" theory was permanently
laid to rest. This did not prove to be the case. In Rohauer v. Killiam Shows,
Inc., it was dramatically revived, at least in the context of renewal rights.
Will Rohauer be followed in future cases so that derivative work copyright
owners are now safe in not attempting to obtain licenses from the members of
a successor renewal class in whom the renewal has vested?6 0
In G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.6 1 as in Fitch v.
Shubert and Marks Music, the original grant of rights in the under-
lying literary or musical work only covered the original term of copy-
right, and did not include the renewal term, as it did in Rohauer and
the "Rear Window" litigation. As noted by Judge Friendly in
Rohauer:
Ricordi is not determinative here, however, for a fundamental reason: the
original 1901 agreement between Long, Belasco, and Ricordi did not purport
to run beyond the original term of Long's copyright on the novel. Ricordi
neither sought nor obtained operatic rights in the renewal term of the novel
in the 1901 agreement, or in any other negotiation. To conclude that the re-
newal term of a copyright is a new estate free from previous licenses is one
thing when, as in Ricordi, the parties have never bargained for renewal rights,
and another when, as in the case of Mrs. Hull and Joseph Moskowitz, the as-
signment agreement explicitly included rights to the derivative work during
the renewal term.6 2
Nor did Gilliam63 (which did not even involve a renewal rights is-
sue) "repudiate" the theory, on which Rohauer was decided, since
59. A. LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 87-88 (5th ed. 1979) (citations omitted) (em-
phasis in original). See also A. LATMAN, R. GORMAN, & J. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR
THE EIGHTIES 216-26 (2d ed. 1985).
60. M. NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.07[A] at 3-23, 3-24, 3-25, 3-31 (1985)
(citations omitted).
61. 189 F.2d 469, 89 U.S.P.Q. 289, 28 COPYRIGHT OFF. BULL. 423 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 342 U.S. 849 (1951).
62. 551 F.2d at 491.
63. Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 192 U.S.P.Q. 1,
40 COPYRIGHT OFF. BULL. 529 (2d Cir. 1976).
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Rohauer was decided some six months after Gilliam. Indeed, Gil-
liam is consistent with Rohauer in that the court in Gilliam decided
that the authors' grant did not permit the editing of "approximately
27 percent of the original program .... [T]he editing contravened
contractual provisions that limited the right to edit the Monte Py-
thon material."64 Thus, in Gilliam the authors' consent (to edit) had
not been given, whereas in Rohauer the original grant was not lim-
ited (in time), but specifically included the copyright renewal term.
The key to these cases, it would seem, is the author's consent,-
given in Rohauer and in the "Rear Window" litigation to include the
renewal term, not given in Fitch, Ricordi, Marks, or Gilliam. Refer-
ring to Edmonds v. Stern, the source of this part of the debate, Judge
Friendly, in his analysis of the section 7 derivative work copyright,
felt that Rohauer was "only a slight extension of this court's decision
in Edmonds v. Stern. "65 As quoted by Judge Friendly in Rohauer,
the court in Edmonds stated:
The two things [the song and the orchestral score] were legally separate, and
independent of each other; it makes no difference that such separate and in-
dependent existence might to a certain extent have grown out of plaintiff's
consent to the incorporation of his melody in the orchestration. When that
consent was given, a right of property sprang into existence, not at all affected
by the conveyance of any other right.
6 6
Judge Friendly pointed out the quite different facts present in
Rohauer: "So here when the purchaser from Mrs. Hull embodied her
story in a motion picture which was copyrighted under § 7, the vest-
ing of the renewal right of the story in her daughter did not affect
the property right in the copyrighted derivative work." 67
Whether or not it is useful to the discussion to characterize
Rohauer as dependent on a "right of property [that] sprang into exist-
ence" upon creation of the derivative work, the court did not do so in
Rohauer, relying more directly on the "new work" derivative copy-
right provided for in section 7 of the 1909 Act.68
It is this writer's view that Judge Friendly's opinion is well rea-
soned, addresses all the issues and ought to be followed, because
copyright protection and all rights under copyright have been
granted by section 7 to "adaptations ... dramatizations ... or other
64. 538 F.2d at 19.
65. 551 F.2d at 492.
66. 248 F. 897, 898 (2d Cir. 1918).
67. 551 F.2d at 492.
68. Id
versions. . . of copyrighted works. . . as new works. ... 69
Other commentators support the reasoning and result in Rohauer.
In 1964, Professor Donald S. Engel, quoted by Judge Friendly in
Rohauer, concluded that:
The cases indicate that the proprietor of the copyright in an authorized new
work who no longer has authorization to use the underlying work may con-
tinue to use the new work in substantially identical form but may not create a
new version of the new work which also constitutes a new version of the un-
derlying work.7
0
Judge Friendly wrote of Professor Engel's analysis:
[Professor Engel] says of Ricordi, correctly in our judgment:
The "Madame Butterfly" case did not hold that the proprietor of the copy-
right in the new work was precluded from making copies of or permitting
public performances of the opera, but merely held that he could not make
general use of the protected underlying material for the creation of a motion
picture, itself a new work based upon the underlying copyright which he no
longer had authorization to use.7
1
In 1963, Barbara A. Ringer, Register of Copyrights at the time of
decision in Rohauer in 1977, reported in her Study No. 31 for the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee on "Renewal of Copyright," as Judge
Friendly said, quite tentatively, that:
It would seem, on the basis of judicial authority, legislative history, and the
opinions of the commentators, that someone cannot avoid his obligations to
the owner of a renewal copyright merely because he created and copyrighted
a "new version" under a license or assignment which terminated at the end of
the first term.7
2
In the drafting process of the famous Copyright Office Studies
(1955-1963),73 the commentators referred to generally by Barbara
Ringer and by Judge Friendly had the opportunity to present differ-
ent points of view, which is perhaps one reason for the tentativeness
of Barbara Ringer's conclusion. In 1961, commenting on Study No. 31
in its then draft form, this writer wrote to Barbara Ringer as follows:
I refer particularly to the discussion on page 169, dealing with whether or not
a motion picture company can continue to distribute a picture without clear-
ing the renewal owner of the basic literary work. I am of the feeling that one
day a court will decide under the present statute that, if the picture has been
produced during the original term of copyright, we may continue to distribute
it during the renewal term of the basic literary work without getting permis-
sion from the owner of the renewal. It seems to me that the basic grant from
the original proprietor is the grant of a right to produce and of a right to dis-
69. The 1909 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 7 (emphasis added).
70. 551 F.2d at 493 (quoting Engel, Importation and Protection of Works of Amer-
ican Authors Manufactured Abroad via the UC.C. Exemption from Formalities: How
Now Sacred Cow?, 12 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 83, 119 n.126 (1964-65)). The views of
some of the commentators are analyzed by Alan Latman. A. LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT
LAW 87-89 (5th ed. 1979).
71. 551 F.2d at 493 (emphasis added by the court).
72. Id. at 492.
73. See 35 Studies on Copyright Prepared for the Copyright Office 1955-1963
(Prints of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate), reprinted in 1
& 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT (Arthur Fisher Memorial Ed. 1963), also reprinted in 1, 2
& 2A G. GROSSMAN, OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (1976).
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tribute. If we fail to produce the picture during the original term of copyright,
I will agree that we cannot produce it during the renewal term without
permission.
There seem to be no cases squarely in point, and the only cases which are ever
discussed have more to do with a situation in which production was not com-
pleted during the original term of copyright .... I would say along with Pro-
fessor Brown's comment that the Ricordi v. Paramount case is talking about
something else ....
There would seem to be something unfair about producing a terribly expen-
sive picture only to be unable to continue to recoup its cost and achieve a
profit if I am not right. Recognizing that the equities do not always control, I
feel that the statute is reasonably clear in giving us this power. I do not think
that the original grant, if exercised, is cut off at the end of the original term of
copyright. I would think that section 7 of the Act relating to new works is a
strong basis for my opinion. It entitles the producer of an adaptation or dram-
atization to have copyright in the new work, and this right should include all
aspects of copyright, such as, distribution and sale. I would give full force to
the clause after the semicolon, and I do not deny it. I am not questioning the
copyright in the underlying work, but making realistic the copyright in the
new work, and I am not seeking to extend the term of copyright in the under-
lying work. 7 4
Barbara Ringer replied in part:
I certainly agree that there is room for more than one point of view on the
rights in a "new version" as against renewal rights in the basic work. How-
ever, I still feel that the Fitch and Ricordi cases are pretty strong authority
and, although neither directly involves distribution or exhibition of motion
pictures, I think the situations were closely analogous ....
In the last analysis, it seems to me that the policy arguments in your fourth
paragraph are much the same as the court's thinking underlying the decision
in Twelfth Street Rag-that it is unfair for someone who has invested in a new
version to be deprived by renewal of all right to use it. Actually, the equities
strike me as more persuasive in the case of an expensive motion picture than
they do in the case of a popular song. I think the Twelfth Street Rag case fur-
nishes your strongest legal argument, but as indicated on page 175 of the study
I think that case is bad law.7 5
In Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder,7 6 the Supreme Court, without
reaching a conclusion, and perhaps saving the issue for Abend II, re-
cently noted that:
Thus, according to respondents, the original-term transferee who had made a
derivative work could be enjoined from continuing to use the derivative work
because it might infringe the underlying copyright in the renewal term. Some
observers apparently believed that the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit acknowledged support for this view in G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., when it wrote that "[a] copyright renewal creates a new estate,
and the few cases which have dealt with the subject assert that the new estate
is clear of all rights, interests or licenses granted under the original copy-
74. Richard Colby letter to Barbara A. Ringer, then Acting Chief, Examining Di-
vision, Copyright Office, later Register of Copyrights (January 11, 1961).
75. Barbara A. Ringer letter to Richard Colby (January 26, 1961).
76. 105 S. Ct. 638, 224 U.S.P.Q. 313, 29 P.T.C.J. 240, COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH)
25,739 (1985). See supra note 27.
right." Therefore, respondents reason that there was confusion after Ricordi
regarding whether the law allowed a derivative-work owner to utilize the
work after the expiration of the underlying copyright or whether the law pro-
hibited all utilization of the derivative work.
7 7
The dissenting opinion in Mills Music, helpful in this respect to the
thesis of this study, pointed out that a "narrower interpretation even-
tually prevailed, but not until after passage of the 1976 Act. See
Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc. "78
THE 1976 ACT As GUIDE To THE 1909 ACT
A court must grope to ascertain what would have been the thought of the 1909
Congress on an issue about which it almost certainly never thought at all.
To such extent as it may be permissible to consider policy considerations, the
equities lie preponderantly in favor of the proprietor of the derivative
copyright.
We find recognition of these policy considerations in §§ 203(b)(1) and
304(c)(6)(A) of the recently enacted copyright revision bill, 90 Stat. 2541
(1976).
While it is true that this proviso was part of a package which extended the
temporal rights of authors (but also of their assignees) and that the proviso
thus does not deal with the precise situation here presented, we nevertheless
regard it as evidence of a belief on the part of Congress of the need for special
protection for derivative works.7 9
In applying these "policy considerations," Judge Friendly commented
that:
In connection with a new plan whereby copyright in any work created on or
after January 1, 1978 or created before that date but not then yet published or
copyrighted shall, with certain exceptions, run for the life of the author plus
50 years, with any grant of a transfer or license subject to a right of termina-
tion between the 35th and 40th year of the grant; and the renewal term of any
existing copyright is extended for another 19 years subject to a right of termi-
nation of any transfer or license at the end of the 28th year of the renewal
term over a like period of five years, Congress expressly provided:
A derivative work prepared under authority of the grant before its termina-
tion may continue to be utilized under the terms of the grant after its termi-
nation, but this privilege does not extend to the preparation after the
termination of other derivative works based upon the copyrighted work cov-
ered by the terminated grant.
[17 U.S.C.] §§203(b)(1), 304(c)(6)(A). While it is true that this proviso was part
of a package which extended the temporal rights of authors (but also of their
assignees) and that the proviso thus does not deal with the precise situation
here presented, we nevertheless regard it as evidence of a belief on the part of
Congress of the need for special protection for derivative works. We agree, of
course, that provisions of the new Act cannot be read as varying clear provi-
sions of the 1909 Act in cases to which the new Act does not apply.8 0
77. Id. at 652 n.45 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). As noted at the beginning
of this article, the Supreme Court may well address the issue if and when the present
"Rear Window" litigation reaches the Court.
78. Id. at 655 n.7 (White, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
79. Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 486, 493, 494.
80. Id. at 494.
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As to whether a court should look to what later Congresses felt when
interpreting old statutes, Judge Friendly, quoting Judge Lumbard in
Goodis v. United Artists Television, Inc., said:
However, the present situation fits rather well under Judge Lumbard's lan-
guage in Goodis v. United Artists Television, Inc.:
Our decision today is that the result which the proposed legislation would
compel is not precluded in any way by the decisions rendered under the
present Copyright Act. As discussed earlier, the "problem" with which the
proposed legislation deals is one which exists because of judicial dicta ren-
dered in cases not apposite to the factual situation before us in this case.8 1
In Abend II defendants have a stronger case than in Rohauer in
that the 1976 Act (as viewed by Judge Friendly) applies in part to the
"independent" renewal copyright in the motion picture "Rear Win-
dow" under section 103(b) and sections 103 and 112 of the Transi-
tional and Supplementary Provisions, which follow Chapter 8 of the
1976 Act. The original copyright in "Rear Window" was secured in
1954 under section 7 of the 1909 Act as a "new work," and renewed
for 47 years in 1982 under the 1976 Act.
Thus, the section 7, 1954 copyright in "Rear Window" as a "new
work" was extended in 1982 as an "independent" copyright under
sections 103(b) and 304(a) of the 1976 Act-"independent" of the
copyright in the Woolrich story. The cause of action in Abend II
arose under the 1909 Act, under which "Rear Window" was created
and first released, and under the 1976 Act when defendant Universal
reissued "Rear Window" in 1983. And so, the 1976 Act applies to de-
fendants' rights in Abend II for two reasons: the cause of action arose
after the effective date of that Act, and the 1954 motion picture copy-
right had been renewed in 1982 under the 1976 Act.
To the extent that it may be permissible to consider legislative pol-
icy under the 1976 Act, as applicable to the 1982 copyright renewal of
the motion picture "Rear Window," the congressional policy embod-
ied in section 304(c)(6)(A), the derivative works exception, directs
that the copyright owner of the motion picture shall continue to have
the right to distribute that derivative work-the motion picture
"Rear Window"-during the renewal copyright term of the underly-
ing story on which that motion picture was based.
In interpreting the copyright renewal provisions of section 304(a)
of the 1976 Act, which track the renewal provisions of section 24 of
the 1909 Act, the courts in Abend II will likely be called upon to con-
81. Id. at 494 (citation omitted) (quoting Judge Lumbard in Goodis v. United Art-
ists Television, Inc., 425 F.2d 397, 403 (2d Cir. 1970)).
sider "pre-1978" cases including Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., Rus-
sell v. Price8 2 and Filmvideo v. Hastings,8 3 as well as the comment
on Rohauer in Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder by four Justices of the
United States Supreme Court that Rohauer "eventually prevailed."8 4
"GONE WITH THE WIND"
Issues similar to those decided in 1977 in Rohauer might have been
litigated as early as 1964 as to distribution rights in "Gone With The
Wind." The novel was published in 1936, its author, Margaret Mitch-
ell, died in 1949, and the copyright in the novel was timely renewed
by Stephens Mitchell, her statutory successor. MGM, the distributor,
elected to confirm its United States distribution rights by a 1963
agreement with Stephens Mitchell.
In 1984, questions concerning sequel rights in the novel came to
court, in Trust Company Bank, as Executor of the Last Will of Ste-
phens Mitchell v. MGM/UA Entertainment Co. In the course of its
opinion, the district court, probably referring to United States distri-
bution rights in MGM's classic motion picture, said that "MGM had
to enter into a contract with Stephens Mitchell or lose its rights to
Gone With The Wind in 1963, when the copyright expired and when
Stephens Mitchell would have been free to contract with anyone else
regarding rights to Gone With The Wind."85
The district court's decision, that sequel rights in the novel are
owned by plaintiff (author's brother's estate) and not by MGM/UA,
was affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit in September of 1985.86
The Rohauer decision, which came some fourteen years after the
1963 MGM agreement with Stephens Mitchell, is not referred to in
the foregoing 1984 and 1985 opinions in Trust Company Bank v.
MGM!UA.
RUSSELL V. PRICE (PYGMALION)
Of greater significance as a practical matter to the present "Rear
Window" litigation, Abend II, is the 1979 opinion of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit in Russell v. Price (Pygmalion),87 in
82. See irfra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
84. Mills Music, 105 S. Ct. at 655 n.7 (White, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (em-
phasis added). See supra notes 6 and 27 and accompanying text.
85. 593 F. Supp. 580, 584, 223 U.S.P.Q. 1046, 1049-50, COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH)
25,745 at 19,359 (N.D. Ga. 1984), aff'd, 772 F.2d 740 (11th Cir. 1985).
86. 772 F.2d 740 (11th Cir. 1985).
87. 612 F.2d 1123, 205 U.S.P.Q. 206, 43 COPYRIGHT OFF. BULL. 768, COPYRIGHT L.
DEC. (CCH) 25,125 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952 (1980). See Moyles, Rus-
sell v. Price: A Limitation on the Use of Derivative Works, 11 GOLDEN GATE U.L.
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which that court commented critically on Rohauer. In something of a
switch in roles, Rohauer was cited to the court by the defendant, who
in Russell had used the derivative work without the consent, not only
of the producer of the motion picture, then in the public domain, but
also without license at any time from the author of the underlying
play. 88
In distinguishing Russell from Rohauer, the court was quick to
point out fundamental and "significant differences" in fact and in
theory between the two,8 9 and said it would "express no opinion
about the merits of Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc. "--although the
court proceeded to do so nonetheless. 90 Writing for the Court of Ap-
peals, Judge Goodwin noted:
First, the Rohauer court placed heavy emphasis on the nongratuitous intent of
the nonsurviving author to convey film rights in the novel's renewal term, a
promise which had been bargained for in the initial assignment. The defend-
ants here have never bargained with Shaw or his successors for anything, nor
do they enjoy any relationship with anyone who had so bargained.
A second important difference between the favored party in Rohauer and the
defendants here is that the defendant Killiam there was the proprietor of the
still valid copyright in the film. By virtue of that copyright, Killiam was held
to have sufficient rights in the matter derived from the novel to continue
showing it as part of the film. 9 1
In Russell, the author of the underlying stage play, George Bernard
Shaw, did not die during the original copyright term of the play,
which expired in 1941. Shaw lived on into the renewal term of the
play, and timely renewed that copyright. Shaw did not die until 1950.
Thus, the issue in Russell did not involve conflicting claims between
the statutory successor of an author and a distributor of a motion pic-
ture. It did not matter, indeed, under the copyright law that Shaw
had died, and it did not matter that the copyright in the play was in
its extended 19 year renewal term.92
The question in Russell would have been the same if Shaw were
living and the action had arisen during the first 28 years of the copy-
right renewal term of play. Judge Goodwin framed the issue as
follows:
REV. 323 (1981). For the Ninth Circuit's most recent reference to Russell, "our leading
film case," see Lone Ranger Television, Inc. v. Program Radio Corp., 740 F.2d 718, 722,
223 U.S.P.Q. 112, 115, COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 25,691 at 19,090 (9th Cir. 1984). See
also N. BOORSTYN, I COPYRIGHT L.J. 51-54 (1984-85).
88. Russell, 612 F.2d at 1126-27.
89. Id. at 1126-28.
90. See infra text accompanying note 94.
91. 612 F.2d at 1127.
92. The 1976 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 304.
Defendants' main contention on the primary issue in this litigation is simply
stated: Because the film copyright on "Pygmalion" has expired, that film is in
the public domain, and, consequently, prints of that film may be used freely
by anyone. Thus, they argue that their renting out of the film does not in-
fringe the statutory copyright on Shaw's play.
9 3
Defendants' reliance on Rohauer was misplaced. Nevertheless, the
Court commented on Rohauer in several footnotes, each of which no
doubt will be recalled in Abend II:
12. It is on this basis that the court in Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc. dist-
ingushed Ricordi and Fitch v. Shubert. The court noted, for example, that the
"fundamental reason" Ricordi's holding, that the renewal copyright in the de-
rivative work extended only to the new matter in that version, was not deter-
minative in Rohauer was that in the former the assignment agreement
" * * did not purport to run beyond the original term of [the]
copyright on the novel * * *. To conclude that the renewal term
of a copyright is a new estate free from previous licenses is one
thing when, as in Ricordi, the parties have never bargained for
renewal rights, and another when, as in the [Rohauer] case * * *,
the assignment agreement explicitly included rights to the deriv-
ative work during the renewal term."
13. We note that the so-called "new property rights" theory which Rohauer
v. Killiam Shows, Inc. seems partially to adopt, had been consistently rejected
in earlier decisions as well as by the nation's foremost authority on copyright
law. Professor Nimmer states the theory as follows:
"* * * [OInce a derivative work is created pursuant to a valid li-
cense to use the underlying material, a new property right
springs into existence with respect to the entire derivative work,
so that even if the license is thereafter terminated the proprietor
of the derivative work may nevertheless continue to use the ma-
terial from the underlying work as contained in the derivative
work."
16. A copyright proprietor has an exclusive monopoly over all uses of the
protected work, including the right to copy, print, vend, publish, make other
versions of, perform or exhibit the work. 17 U.S.C. §1. Thus, we find Judge
Friendly's attempt to limit G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., to its
specific facts unconvincing. The 1909 Act made no distinction between a copy-
right owner's right to authorize copying or exhibition of the work as it ap-
pears in an existing derivative work and the right to authorize creation of a
new derivative work. Nor did the court in a case involving essentially the
same question as that which confronts us. Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v.
Hastings.
9 4
Nevertheless, Judge Goodwin noted that:
A prominent rationale in that case [Rohauer] for awarding those limited
rights in favor of the owner of the derivative copyright is the protection and
encouragement of the "large and independently copyrightable" "literary, mu-
sical and economic" contributions of the "person who with the consent of the
author has created an opera or a motion picture film" from a copyrighted
novel.
9 5
This form of derivative work which, as a "new work," is entitled to
its own section 7 copyright, was distributed in Rohauer with the origi-
nal "nongratuitous intent" of the author; in Russell, "defendants
93. 612 F.2d at 1126.
94. Id at 1127 nn.12-13, 1128 n.16 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
95. Id. at 1127 (citation omitted).
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neither stand in the shoes of, nor are in privity with, anyone else...
who might arguably still enjoy some right of distribution." 96
The words, "new estate," in relation to the copyright renewal term,
ought to be used carefully in the light of the facts-if no rights have
been granted into the renewal term (Fitch, Marks and Ricordi), then,
indeed, it is harmless to characterize the renewal as a new estate free
and clear of all licenses granted during the original term.97
FILMVIDEO V. HASTINGS (HOPALONG CASSIDY)
In Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings (Hopalong Cassidy),98 the
Second Circuit in 1981 had the Russell issue before it-whether the
unlicensed exhibition of a public domain motion picture prevails over
the rights of the copyright owner of the underlying literary work.
The court specifically said, "We agree with the Ninth Circuit, Russell
v. Price, . . . that the answer is 'No.' "99 Without commenting on
other interesting issues in the "Hopalong Cassidy" litigation, such as
the copyrightability of the characters,10 0 the Second Circuit disposed
96. Id. at 1125 n.3.
97. See supra text accompanying note 55.
98. 668 F.2d 91, 218 U.S.P.Q. 750, COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 25,339 (2d Cir. 1981).
99. Id. at 92.
100. In the district court, Judge Werker held that the characters, including
Hopalong Cassidy, that were created by Clarence E. Mulford, were "copyrightable"
and protected from infringement by copyright law. Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Has-
tings, 509 F. Supp. 60, 212 U.S.P.Q. 195, COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 25,222 (S.D.N.Y.
1981). The issue was critical because some of the motion pictures that had been exhib-
ited without license from the copyright owner of the underlying literary works were
based on original story lines (not on the licensed stories in the Mulford books), and
thus infringement would depend on whether "the Cassidy shown in the motion pic-
tures was that different from the character in the books." Id. at 65. Judge Werker
stated, "In my opinion, these characters and others were sufficiently delineated, devel-
oped and well known to the public to be copyrightable." Id. at 66. See Jaszi, When
Works Collide: Derivative Motion Pictures, Underlying Rights, and the Public Inter-
est, 28 UCLA L. REV. 715 (1981); Nevins, The Doctrine of Copyright Ambush: Limita-
tions on the Free Use of Public Domain Derivative Works, 25 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 58
(1981).
A few months after his January 1981, decision in Filmvideo, Judge Werker in July
1981 wrote the opinion deciding Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn Mayer, Inc. [Tarzan],
519 F. Supp. 388, 215 U.S.P.Q. 37, COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 25,277 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
aff'd with issue expressly left open, 683 F.2d 610, 621, 631 (2d Cir. 1982) (as noted by
Judge Newman for the Second Circuit in Warner Bros. Inc. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231, 240,
222 U.S.P.Q. 101, 108, COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 25,584 at 18,449 (2d Cir. 1983)). In
Burroughs, Judge Werker stated, "It is beyond cavil that the character 'Tarzan' is de-
lineated in a sufficiently distinctive fashion to be copyrightable." Id. at 391. One year
earlier, on June 24, 1980, denying a motion for preliminary injunction in the same
"Tarzan" litigation, Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn Mayer, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 1320, 210
U.S.P.Q. 579, 44 COPYRIGHT OFF. BULL. 176, COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 25,165
of the issue whether the underlying copyrighted stories were thrown
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd without opinion, 636 F.2d 1200 (2d Cir. 1980), Judge Werker had
stated: "Whether the Tarzan characters appearing in the author's works are copyright-
able or not, it is clear that the 1931 agreement was not intended to, and did not purport
to, grant MGM any copyright interest." Id. at 1324 (citations omitted).
On the appeal of Judge Werker's 1981 decision on the merits of the "Tarzan" litiga-
tion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 683 F.2d 610,
215 U.S.P.Q. 495, COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 25,406 (2d Cir. 1982). The court noted,
Changing its earlier view that the 1931 Agreement was not intended to grant
MGM a copyright interest, the [district] court held that the character
"Tarzan" was sufficiently unique to be copyrightable and that the grant of a
license to use the character "Tarzan" was a copyright interest subject to ter-
mination under § 304.
Id. at 620 (citations omitted).
Holding that the section 304 (c) termination notice failed for procedural reasons, and
therefore that it was unnecessary to decide the issue whether the Tarzan character
was a sufficiently copyrightable interest to be subject to termination, Judge Kearse,
writing for the Court of Appeals, referred to "the venerable question as to whether
and in what circumstances an author's creation of a fictional character can be pro-
tected by copyright . . . [as to which] we express no view." Id. at 621. In a footnote,
Judge Kearse further stated that "[i]f 'Tarzan' is not copyrightable, ERB, Inc.'s grant
of the right to use the character was not a right under copyright, and thus was not
subject to termination under 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)." Id, at 621 n.11. In his concurring
opinion, Judge Newman, for purposes of reaching the question whether the termina-
tion notice was adequate, made "the assumption that the character Tarzan is suffi-
ciently delineated to support a copyright. ... Id. at 631.
Since courts in particular cases may disagree as to whether characters are copyright-
able, sequel rights and termination rights under section 203 and section 304(c) of the
1976 Act may be at risk.
On these issues of copyrightability of characters, sequel rights, reversions and termi-
nation rights, see Ellingson, The Copyright Exception for Derivative Works and the
Scope of Utilization, 56 IND. L.J. 1, 35-37 (1980), 29 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. [ASCAP] 83,
125-28 (1983); Cohen, Derivative Works Under The Termination Provisions of the 1976
Act, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 380, 407 n.73 (1980-81); Stein, Termination of Transfers
and Licenses Under The New Copyright Act: Thorny Problems For The Copyright Bar,
24 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1149-64 (1977), 26 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. [ASCAP] 1, 24-32 (1981).
See also Brylawski, Protection of Characters-Sam Spade Revisited, 22 BULL. COPY-
RIGHT Soc'Y 77 (1974-75); Zissu, Whither Character Rights: Some Observations, 29 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 121 (1981-82); R. WINCOR, FROM RITUAL TO ROYALTIES (1962); Da-
vidow, Copyright Protection for Fictional Characters: A Trademark-Based Approach to
Replace Nichols, 8 ART & THE LAW 513 (1984). On trademark protection for the
Tarzan mark, covering a wide variety of goods, see Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc., v.
Mann Theatres, 195 U.S.P.Q. 159 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
Copyrightability of literary characters (as distinguished from cartoon characters) re-
mains an open question in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. As Judge
Newman noted in Warner Bros. Inc. v. ABC (Superman v. The Greatest American
Hero):
Copyrightability of a literary character has on occasion been recognized, Bur-
roughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 388, 391 (S.D.N.Y 1981)
(Tarzan), aff'd with issue expressly left open, 683 F.2d 610, 621 (2d Cir. 1982).
However, there has been no doubt that copyright protection is available for
characters portrayed in cartoons, even before Nichols ....
720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1983).
By way of reflection on renewals, terminations and copyrightability of characters,
Professor Ralph S. Brown has recalled:
I still have my notes on it, marking my discovery of such arcane concepts as
the divided term, 28 years renewable for another 28. That's been abolished in
favor of something even more arcane called "termination of grants" that I will
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into the public domain when the copyrights on the derivative motion
pictures were not renewed, stating that "[s]ince the proprietor of a
derivative copyright cannot convey away that which he does not own,
it follows that he cannot release that which he does not own into the
public domain." 10 1 Judge Van Graafeiland, writing for the court, con-
tinued, "To the extent that Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc. may have
departed from the doctrine established in the above cited cases, the
aberration was a minor one, and it is not dispositive of the issues in
the instant case."'10 2
It is not clear why the court felt that Rohauer "departed from the
doctrine established" in previous cases, except perhaps in the sense
that the Rohauer defendant was permitted to continue to use the un-
derlying work to the extent embodied in the derivative work-a far
cry from saying that the underlying work was thrown into the public
domain, free for anyone to use. As noted by the Ninth Circuit in
Russell, "[b]y virtue of that [section 7] copyright, Killiam was held to
have sufficient rights in the matter derived from the novel to con-
tinue showing it as part of the film."103 That this is probably what
Judge Van Graafeiland meant by referring, in a limited way, to
Rohauer as an "aberration," albeit "a minor one," may become
clearer on reading the balance of Judge Graafeiland's discussion:
The precise holding in Rohauer was that a derivative copyright proprietor
who had been promised a reconveyance of his license rights upon renewal of
the underlying copyright, could enforce that promise as against the statutory
successors of the deceased proprietor of the underlying copyright. The succes-
sors did not lose the protection inherent in the underlying copyright except to
the limited extent that a right of derivative use had been granted the licensee.
The licensee received no more than the right of use covered by the terms of
the licensing agreement. His derivative copyright was not expanded to en-
compass that which was borrowed from the underlying work; he could not
reproduce the borrowed material in other forms or versions as if it were his
own original contribution. In short, he had no proprietary interest in the un-
derlying copyrighted material which would enter the public domain upon the
lapse of his own copyright.
Indeed, as Judge Friendly noted in Rohauer, a purpose of Congress in enact-
spare you any elucidation of, largely because I barely understand it myself (in
this I am not alone - there is a recent complex case before the Second Circuit
about Tarzan of the Apes in which those very able judges Kearse and New-
man each politely suggest, and at some length, that the other doesn't fully un-
derstand it).
Brown, The Joys of Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 477, 478 (1982-83), reprinted
from YALE L. REP. 20-23 (Fall/Winter 1982-83).
101. 668 F.2d at 93 (citations omitted).
102. Id. The "above cited cases" include Ricordi v. Paramount Pictures. See supra
note 61 and accompanying text.
103. 612 F.2d at 1127.
ing the above quoted portion of section 7 was to ensure that a failure of the
derivative copyright would not diminish the statutory protection afforded the
underlying copyright. Appellant Filmvideo, which had no rights under the
1935 licensing agreement, could not dispute appellees' claim to protection
under the Mulford copyright. 10 4
It is essential at this point to reemphasize the impact of section 7 of
the 1909 Act, which distinguishes this renewal issue from all others
reviewed in Fitch, Marks and Ricordi. The fundamental principle is
that a motion picture or other derivative work is a "new work" enti-
tled to an independent and separate copyright under section 7.
FAIR USE
In the present "Rear Window" litigation, Abend II, defendants' An-
swers raise fair use as an affirmative defense, asserting that any and
all of defendants' alleged uses of the "Rear Window" story constitute
a fair use.105 That the use of a story, as transformed into motion pic-
ture form, may fit within the rubric of fair use, is a striking and
novel approach, first invoked by the district court in Rohauer. Con-
sidered particularly in light of the fact that in each such case the au-
thor had consented to use of the underlying literary work in the
making of the motion picture, fair use may well be an additional sup-
port for the section 7 new work copyright. In Rohauer, Judge
Bauman wrote for the district court:
Defendants next argue that even if their showings did infringe plaintiffs'
copyright, such showings constituted a "fair use" of plaintiffs' work. Our
Court of Appeals considered the nature and justification of the fair use doc-
trine in Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 [150
U.S.P.Q. 715] (2nd Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 [152 U.S.P.Q. 844]
(1967). Fair use, it stated, "is a privilege in others than the owner of a copy-
right to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his con-
sent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner." See Ball,
Copyright and Literary Property 260 (1944). Citing Berlin v. E.C. Publica-
tions, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 [141 U.S.P.Q. 1] (2d Cir. 1964), it noted that "courts in
passing upon particular claims of infringement must occasionally subordinate
the copyright holder's interest in a maximum financial return to the greater
public interest in the development of art, science and industry." Hence
whether an infringer will be entitled to the benefit of the fair use privilege
depends on the nature of the infringing work; the most important considera-
tion is whether the distribution of such work "would serve the public interest
in the free dissemination of information." Not surprisingly, therefore, the fair
use privilege has been most frequently extended to works in the fields of sci-
ence, law, medicine, history and biography. See also Public Affairs Associates,
Inc. v. Rickover, 268 F. Supp. 444 [153 U.S.P.Q. 598] (D.D.C. 1967); Eisenschiml
v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 246 F.2d 598 (114 U.S.P.Q. 199] (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 907 [115 U.S.P.Q. 426] (1957).
The factors bearing upon a court's inquiry into a fair use defense have been
well stated by Judge Lasker in Marvin Worth Productions v. Superior Films
Corporation, 319 F. Supp. 1269 [168 U.S.P.Q. 693] (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The court
104. 668 F.2d at 93 (citation omitted).
105. Defendants' Answers, Sixth Affirmative Defense, Abend v. MCA Inc., No. 84-
2483 AAH (C.D. Cal. filed June 21, 1984).
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must determine: (1) was there a substantial taking, qualitatively or quantita-
tively; (2) if there was, did the taking materially reduce the demand for the
original copyrighted property; (3) does the distribution of the infringing mate-
rial serve the public interest in the free dissemination of information; (4) does
the preparation of the material require the use of prior materials dealing with
the same subject matter. 319 F. Supp. at 1274 [168 U.S.P.Q. at 697-98].
A consideration of but one of these factors is sufficient to dispose of defend-
ants' claim. There is no discernible public interest in the dissemination of
"The Son of the Sheik" sufficient to justify the infringement. Even a cursory
examination of those cases in which courts have recognized a significant coun-
tervailing public interest in infringing material indicates how far short de-
fendants' argument falls.
In Time Incorporated v. Bernard Geis Associates, 293 F. Supp. 130 [159
U.S.P.Q. 663] (S.D.N.Y. 1968), sketches based on a film of President Kennedy's
assassination were found justified as a fair use because of the "public interest
in having the fullest information available" on that event. In Meeropol v.
Nizer, 361 F. Supp. 1063 [179 U.S.P.Q. 660] (S.D.N.Y. 1973), the publication of
letters of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg was deemed justified by "the continuing
interest in and importance of the celebrated Rosenberg case." It can scarcely
be argued here that the enduring fame of Rudolph Valentino or the intrinsic
literary and historical merit of "The Son of the Sheik" (whatever it may be)
serves any public interest sufficient to endow these defendants with the privi-
lege of fair use. 1
0 6
As now articulated in section 107 of the 1976 Act, the four statu-
tory fair use "factors" reflect "the purpose and general scope of the
judicial doctrine of fair use .. .one of the most important and well-
established limitations on the exclusive right of copyright owners...
given express statutory recognition for the first time in section
107."107
Merely listing the four fair use factors recognized by section 107,
and thinking of the facts in Rohauer and in Abend II, is instructive:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work. 1 0 8
106. 379 F. Supp. 723, 732-33, 183 U.S.P.Q. 592, 39 COPYRIGHT OFF. BULL. 665,
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), discussed in W. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW
420-24 (1985).
107. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65-66 (1976), reprinted in N. BOOR-
STYN, COPYRIGHT LAW, App. A:4 at 498 (1981 & Supp. 1985), M. NIMMER, 4 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT 4-25, 4-27 (1985), 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5678-79, 17 G.
GROSSMAN, OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (1977).
108. The 1976 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107.
For the most recent (and only, in recent decades) decisions on fair use in the United
States Supreme Court, see Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
[Betamax], 464 U.S. 417, 220 U.S.P.Q. 665, COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 25,615, 27
P.T.C.J. 259 (1984), reh'g denied, 465 U.S. 1112 (1984); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.
Examination of the third factor may be the most important of the
four in this situation. 109 Regardless of how much of the original
story "appears on the screen," it takes the screenwriters' craft, the di-
rector's art and the performers' talent to transform the story into a
motion picture. Rather than advocate a rule that will depend on "the
amount" of the story used, it is suggested that judicial notice be taken
of the major differences in form and substance between any story
and its motion picture version. 110 This magical transformation of the
v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067, 220 U.S.P.Q. 210, COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) $
25,506 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 723 F.2d 195, 220 U.S.P.Q. 321, COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH)
25,604 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 2218, 225 U.S.P.Q. 1073, COPYRIGHT L. DEC.
(CCH) 25,793, 30 P.T.C.J. 63, 77 (1985). Harper & Row is noted in N. BOORSTYN, II
COPYRIGHT L.J. 2-6 (1985-86).
For Bills which would affect home audio (not video) recording, see H.R. 2911, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. E3108-09 (daily ed. June 27, 1985), COPYRIGHT L. REP.
(CCH) 20,324 (the proposed Home Audio Recording Act) and S. 1739, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S12795-99 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1985), COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH)
20,330 (Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. et al.), on which a Hearing was held on Oc-
tober 30, 1985, by the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and
Trademarks. COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 20,336 (1985). For discussion of the Hearing,
see N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1985, at 20, col. 1.
On fair use, see generally, M. NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 (1985); N.
BOORSTYN, COPYRIGHT LAW §§ 5:2, 10:27 (1981 & Supp. 1985); N. Boorstyn, The Doc-
trine of Fair Use, I COPYRIGHT L.J. 1-12 (1984-85); W. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE
IN COPYRIGHT LAW (1985); Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works, Copyright Office
Study No. 14 (1958), reprinted in 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 781 (Arthur Fisher Memo-
rial ed. 1963), cited in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 451 n.34 (majority opinion by Stevens, J.), 465-66, 465 n.13 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing); Hon. Robert W. Kastenmeier, Alan Latman-A Congressional Tribute, 32 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 7 (1984), reprinted in Tributes to Alan Latman, 6 Kaminstein Pro-
ject, supra note 54, at iv-xxi (1985).
One reads the tribute of the late Professor Melville B. Nimmer (who passed away
on November 23, 1985), 32 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 11-12 (1984-85), to the late Professor
Alan Latman (who died on July 20, 1984) with difficulty. Professor Nimmer acknowl-
edges Professor Latman's contribution to the law of Fair Use, quoting in his Treatise
from the argument by Professor Latman at the Supreme Court of the United States in
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 420 U.S. 376, 184 U.S.P.Q. 705 (1975), af-
firming, by an equally divided court, 4 to 4, Justice Blackmun not participating, the 4
to 3 decision of the Court of Claims, 487 F.2d 1345, 203 Ct. Cl. 74, 180 U.S.P.Q. 49
(1973). M. NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[E], at 13-108 to 13-109 n.122
(1985).
For Justice Blackmun's views disapproving of the Fair Use decision by the Court of
Claims in Williams & Wilkins, see his dissenting opinion for four Justices of the
Supreme Court in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 417,
467 n.16.
See Colby, Tribute to Professor Melville B. Nimmer, 11 NEW MATTER (Journal of the
Intellectual Property Section of the State Bar of California), No. 1, Spring 1986, at 7.
109. Notwithstanding Justice O'Connor's statement for the court in Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises: "Finally, the Act focuses on 'the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.' This last factor is
undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use. See 3 Nimmer [on Copy-
right] § 13.05[A], at 13-76, and cases cited therein." 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2234 (1985) (empha-
sis added).
110. Cf. Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 487 ("new versions of copyrighted works might in-
volve a degree of intellectual effort and expense quite as great as or considerably
[Vol. 13: 569, 1986] Rohauer Revisited
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printed word into a three-dimensional art form, requiring the partici-
pation of so many other talents, would generally suggest that a fair
use defense may well be applicable-where the author had consented
to the making of a motion picture based on the author's story.'
CONCLUSION
If the plaintiff in the present "Rear Window" litigation, Abend II,
is able to overcome various, serious obstacles to judgment indicated
in the pleadings, the District Court and the Ninth Circuit and ulti-
mately the Supreme Court of the United States may at last have the
opportunity to address the Rohauer issue, which the Supreme Court
elected not to hear in 1977. On balance, textual analysis of the 1909
Act, policy considerations, the equities, legislative policy formulated
in the development of the Copyright Act of 1976, and the views of
commentators (with some division) indicate that the Rohauer rule as
enunciated by Judge Friendly in 1977 should prevail.
greater than the contribution of the author of the underlying work. ). See also
Mills Music Inc. v. Snyder, 105 S. Ct. 638 (1985):
As a matter of fact-or of judicial notice-we are in no position to evaluate
the function that each music publisher actually performs in the marketing of
each copyrighted song. But based on our reading of the statute and its legisla-
tive history. . . we find no reason to differentiate between a book publisher's
license to a motion-picture producer and a music publisher's license to a rec-
ord company.
Id. at 651. See supra note 27.
111. In its last copyright case in the 1984-85 Term, Dowling v. United States, 105 S.
Ct. 3127, 226 U.S.P.Q. 529, COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 25,795 (1985), the Supreme
Court developed definitional tools which would seem to presage their application to
new issues on the copyright horizon, such as the first sale doctrine and the distribution
right under section 106(3) and section 109(a), and the distinction under section 202 be-
tween a material object (copy or phonorecord) and a copyright which may be embodied
in that material object. "Thus, the property rights of a copyright holder have a charac-
ter distinct from the possessory interest of the owner of simple 'goods, wares, [or] mer-
chandise' ...." Id. at 3133 (emphasis added). Dowling is noted in N. BOORSTYN, II
COPYRIGHT L.J. 14-16 (1985-86).
Contrast the right to "vend," in United States v. Minor, 756 F.2d 731, 226 U.S.P.Q. 28,
COPYRIGHT L. DEC. (CCH) 25,807 (9th Cir. 1985), judgment vacated and remanded
for further consideration, 106 S. Ct. 401 (1985), in light of Dowling, to the "distribu-
tion" right, 17 U.S.C. § 106(3). For a broader view, see Colby, The First Sale Doc-
trine-The Defense That Never Was?, supra note 35.

